Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan

March 2017
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1.0 Introduction

Potential emergencies facing dairy producers may include an outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease, serious toxic exposures, and foreign animal diseases (FADs). A rapid response to an animal disease emergency will be necessary to halt the spread of the disease and will require interaction between local, state, and federal agencies and industry partners. The Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan describes the response actions that will be implemented by the CDA in collaboration with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), state agencies and entities, local and state emergency management personnel, local and state law enforcement, brand inspectors, and dairy industry partners to swiftly detect, control, and eradicate a disease outbreak in dairy cattle.

1.1 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the CDA Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan is to provide a framework to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to an outbreak of a highly contagious disease in dairy cattle within the State of Colorado. The goal of this plan is three-fold: to control and eradicate the disease on infected premises as quickly as possible; to help affected facilities to recover; and, to protect and maintain business continuity on unaffected premises during a disease outbreak.

This plan provides the operational considerations and details necessary to minimize the impact of an outbreak in dairy cattle and will be applicable to any highly contagious or economically destructive disease or event that causes significant morbidity or mortality in dairy cattle.

Included in this plan is the management of raw milk located on infected premises. Since not all diseases significant to cattle are passed from the animal to their milk supply, response actions will vary with each disease agent. Response actions pertaining to raw milk on infected premises will be made in collaboration with the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) and CDA; consultation with the milk cooperatives and Western Dairy Association (WDA) will be an important part of the decision making process.

Natural disasters may also cause devastation in the State’s cattle population requiring a similar response. Many of the protocols and procedures presented in this plan, such as disposal methods, will be applicable in a natural disaster event affecting dairy cattle. In such incidents, the CDA Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan may be used as a template to help ensure an adequate response, generally guided by a local jurisdiction such as a county.

1.2 Scope of Authority

As stated in Colorado Revised Statutes (CRS) 35-50-105, “(1) The commissioner is responsible for regulation related to livestock disease or other livestock emergencies among or affecting livestock in the state.” As such, the CDA will serve as the State’s lead agency during an outbreak of a highly contagious disease affecting livestock in Colorado.

Although CDA serves as the lead agency during an animal disease outbreak in Colorado, natural
disasters affecting livestock are typically managed at the local level. County emergency managers can assist producers with developing animal emergency response plans for their premises. When responding to a natural disaster or an outbreak of a highly contagious disease in cattle, local area producers may become a critical response component by providing resource provisions and communicating the threat to area neighbors.

1.3 Situation
The potential impact on Colorado’s economy from a disease outbreak in dairy operations could be devastating. Such an event would be far-reaching, affecting many different sectors beyond the dairy producer, including feedlots, processors, distributors, and retailers.

1.4 Assumptions
- Response to an animal disease outbreak will begin at the local level.
- If an animal disease emergency occurs in Colorado’s dairy cattle industry, the most probable means of discovery will be by dairy cattle producers, private practice veterinarians, and/or trace information from an animal disease investigation in another state. Local livestock experts, such as brand inspectors and livestock extension agents, may be involved in initial local detection and background information about livestock diseases and conditions.
- Private veterinary practitioners will likely be the first responders to any animal disease outbreak.
- Veterinarians are required to immediately notify the State Veterinarian or the USDA-APHIS-VS District 6 - Colorado Office of any suspected foreign animal disease (FAD).
- An animal disease outbreak may occur through natural pathways or could be introduced as an act of terrorism.
- Diagnosis of a highly contagious or emerging animal disease in Colorado, the United States, or surrounding countries may significantly restrict the intrastate, interstate, and international movement of animals (especially livestock) and animal products.
- Initiation and implementation of response actions for a suspected or confirmed positive foreign animal disease (FAD) will be under the jurisdiction of the CDA and carried out by the State Veterinarian or official designee. Producer input will be highly valued and integrated into the response.
- The State Veterinarian and the USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office will work in close coordination in any animal health emergency. There are established protocols for investigating and reporting potential FADs and new and emerging infectious animal diseases.
- Response measures for an animal disease emergency may involve the mutual aid support from sister counties and municipalities as well as local private industry support.
- Animal disease emergencies may lead to prolonged economic impact requiring long-term federal and state assistance programs for response and recovery.
• Psychological counseling and support may need to be available for owners losing livestock or having to depopulate a herd in an animal disease emergency, or for persons responding to the situation.

1.5 Plan Maintenance

The State Veterinarian is responsible for the management and maintenance of this plan, under the jurisdiction of the Colorado Agricultural Commission and the Commissioner of Agriculture or his designee. The CDA Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan will be reviewed and updated as required but as often as needed to incorporate updates to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9 – Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11– Agriculture and Natural Resources, and legislative updates as well as lessons learned that are identified in the debriefing process and after action reports following an actual event or training exercise.

2.0 Concept of Operations

The concept of operations provides the operational framework for activating this plan and how the CDA will classify the response. In addition, this section outlines the diseases of concern in dairy populations. It also provides an overview of the CDA’s responder health and safety program and guidance on how the Department will interface with agencies, the livestock industry, media, and the public during an emergency response event.

2.1 Animal Diseases Significant to Cattle

Animal diseases found in cattle vary in virulence, ease of transmission, mode of transmission, and host affinity. Diseases of concern are highly contagious diseases that cause significant morbidity or mortality in cattle. Such diseases often present similar clinical signs requiring diagnostic testing to determine the specific disease agent. Upon diagnosis, if the disease identified is not considered highly contagious it will be managed within normal business operations, management, and best production practices.

Animal diseases likely to cause high morbidity or mortality in cattle, and trigger activation of this plan, are FADs and new and emerging diseases. A list of diseases cattle are susceptible to is provided by Iowa State University’s Center for Food Security and Public Health: Bovine Diseases and Resources. The website provides additional information on disease transmission, vaccine availability, and recommended control measures for listed FADs. Cattle diseases of major concern include Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP), and Rift Valley Fever (RVF) which are described in the sections below.

2.1.1 Categorization of Animal Diseases

Animal diseases of concern are commonly categorized in the following manner.

• **Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)** (also known as exotic animal disease or transboundary disease) is defined as an important transmissible disease of livestock believed to be absent
from the United States and its territories.

- **New or Emerging Disease** is defined as a completely new disease, an old disease occurring in new places with new presentations, or a disease that is newly resistant to available treatments.

- **OIE List of Reportable Diseases** is a unified list of reportable diseases maintained by The World Organization for Animal Health, once known as the Office of Internationale des Epizooties (OIE). For several years, the OIE created two lists (A and B) with different reporting obligations, but these were combined into a single unified list of reportable diseases in 2005. This list has over 115 different diseases and is revised periodically

  **OIE List of Reportable Diseases (2017)**

  The four criteria used to develop the disease list are: potential for international spread, potential for zoonotic transmission, potential for significant spread within a naïve population, and emerging diseases.

- **CDC Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases** are biological agents that are rarely seen in the United States. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) prioritizes these agents into A, B, and C categories: [CDC Bioterrorism Agents: A,B,C, Categories](#)

  - **Category A** agents and disease are easily transmitted from person to person, have high mortality rates and have the potential for a major public health impact.
  
  - **Category B** agents and disease are moderately easy to disseminate and result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates.
  
  - **Category C** agents and diseases include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination.

- **Zoonotic disease** is defined as a disease that can be transmitted from animals to humans and/or humans to animals. According to the CDC, approximately 75% of recently emerging infectious diseases affecting humans are diseases of animal origin.

2.1.2 **Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)**

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal degenerative zoonotic disease that mainly affects cattle, although other ruminants and humans are occasionally affected. BSE is acquired by eating infected tissues from an affected animal. Infected animals or people do not become ill for years, however, the disease is always progressive and fatal once clinical signs develop.

BSE is a neurodegenerative disease caused by a prion, from the family of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). The incubation period is estimated to be 2 to 8 years, but could be longer. Onset of clinical signs is insidious. Clinical signs include:

- Gait abnormalities
- Difficulty negotiating obstacles
- Low head carriage
- Hyperresponsiveness
- Loss of condition
- Teeth grinding
- Decreased milk production
- Recumbency
The United States tests cattle at slaughter to detect cases of BSE. Testing targets nonambulatory cattle or cattle with neurologic signs. When an infected animal is identified, the affected herd is quarantined and the source of infection investigated. Cohorts of an infected animal are euthanized and tested, and offspring are tracked. Because classical BSE can be prevented by not feeding infected ruminant tissues to cattle, many nations (including the United States) have banned most use of either ruminant or mammalian proteins in livestock feed. Many countries have also enacted various trade bans on importation of ruminants and ruminant products.

2.1.3 Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP)

Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) is a contagious bacterial disease of cattle. Morbidity increases with close confinement. High mortality rates are associated with naïve cattle herds, and many cattle that survive remain chronic carriers.

CBPP is caused by the bacteria Mycoplasma mycoides subspecies mycoides small-colony type. CBPP affects the respiratory and reproductive systems. The organism is mainly transmitted from animal to animal in respiratory aerosols, and close contact is generally thought to be necessary for transmission. The organism can be found in saliva, urine, fetal membranes, and uterine discharges. It does not survive for long periods on fomites. The incubation period is 3 weeks to 6 months. Morbidity can approach 50 to 80% and mortality can range from 10 to 80%, depending on the strain. Clinical signs include:

- Peracute death
- Fever
- Loss of appetite
- Depression
- Coughing
- Mucopurulent nasal discharge
- Rapid respiration
- Dyspnea
- Swollen throat and dewlap
- Decrease in milk production
- Loss of condition
- Abortion and stillbirth
- Polyarthritis in young calves

Measures taken to control a CBPP outbreak include quarantines and movement restrictions, euthanasia of affected and exposed animals, and cleaning and disinfection of affected premises. Vaccination must be approved by state and federal animal health officials, but may be used to control CBPP or protect specific animals. Methods of disease eradication will be considered based on the epidemiological risk assessment, economic impact on the state, and upon the joint agreement of the State Veterinarian, USDA-APHIS-VS, and the dairy industry.

2.1.4 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)

Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease that primarily affects cloven-hooved livestock and wildlife. Although adult animals generally recover, the morbidity rate can
be very high, and the disease can cause significant pain and distress. After recovery, cattle can carry the virus for up to six months, and sometimes longer.

FMD can be readily re-introduced into disease-free regions via animals or animal products. Once introduced, the virus can spread rapidly, particularly if livestock densities are high or detection is delayed. Outbreaks can severely disrupt livestock production, result in embargoes by trade partners, and require significant resources to control.

Milk from dairies within a FMD Control Area must be pasteurized according to OIE standards. See sections 5.10.5.5 and 5.10.5.6 in the *Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book* for procedures for the inactivation of FMD virus in milk and cream for human and animal consumption.

FMD is caused by an *Aphthovirus* of the family *Picornaviridae*. There are more than 60 strains of FMD and immunity to one FMD virus serotype does not protect animals from other serotypes. FMD virus can be found in all secretions from infected animals, including expired air, saliva, milk, urine, feces, and semen, as well as in the fluid from FMD-associated vesicles. Some animals can shed FMD virus for up to four days before the onset of clinical signs. The virus can enter the body by inhalation, ingestion, skin abrasions, or mucous membranes. Cattle are particularly susceptible to the aerosolized virus. The incubation period is 2 to 14 days and morbidity can approach 100%.

**Clinical signs include:**

- Vesicles on tongue, dental pad, gums, soft palate, nostrils, and muzzle
- Vesicles on coronary band, interdigital space, and mammary gland
- Lameness
- Anorexia
- Mucopurulent nasal discharge
- Profuse salivation
  - Lethargy
  - Rapid loss of condition
  - Severe decrease in milk production
  - Increased mortality in young calves

Measures taken to control an FMD outbreak include quarantines and movement restrictions, depopulation of affected and exposed animals, and cleaning and disinfection of affected premises, equipment, and vehicles. Vaccination must be approved by state and federal animal health officials, but may be used to reduce the spread of FMD virus or protect specific animals. Methods of disease eradication will be considered based on the epidemiological risk assessment, economic impact on the state, and upon the joint agreement of the State Veterinarian, USDA-APHIS-VS, and the dairy industry.

2.1.5 *Rift Valley Fever (RVF)*

Rift Valley Fever (RVF) is a zoonotic viral disease affecting many species, including cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. Infections are most severe in sheep and goats. Morbidity varies with breed, pregnancy status, and age of animals, with younger animals being more severely affected. Among adult animals, deaths are most common among pregnant ewes that abort. Outbreaks in domestic animals are often accompanied by human disease.
RVF is caused by a *Phlebovirus* of the family *Bunyaviridae*. There are several genetic lineages of the virus, which differ in virulence. RVF is transmitted by mosquitoes, although the epidemiology of the disease outside savannah regions is poorly understood. Sheep, goats, and cattle are thought to be the primary amplifying hosts among domesticated animals. RVF can be found in blood, as well as abortion and birth products. Small amounts of virus have also been found in oral fluids, nasal discharge, semen, and are thought to occur in milk. Risk from contact with infected animal secretions is debated. The incubation period is approximately 1 to 3 days. Mortality rate is highest in young animals, with mortality in some outbreaks approaching 100% in newborn lambs and kids. Abortion rates in sheep can approach 100%. RVF affects the reproductive, gastrointestinal, and neurologic systems. Clinical signs include:

- Abortion
- Fever
- Anorexia
- Weakness
- Lymphadenopathy
- Hemorrhagic diarrhea
- Melena
- Regurgitation
- Abdominal pain
- Nasal discharge (may be bloody or mucopurulent)
- Elevated respiratory rate
- Neurologic signs
- Ocular signs
- Decreased milk production
- Peracute death in young animals

For humans, specific risk factors include assisting at animal births, having contact with infected animal tissues, and consumption of unpasteurized milk. Measures taken to control a RVF outbreak include public education, vector control, movement restrictions, and possibly vaccination. Methods of disease eradication will be considered based on the epidemiological risk assessment and economic impact on the state, and upon the joint agreement of the State Veterinarian, USDA-APHIS-VS, and the dairy industry.

### 2.2 Colorado Reportable Diseases of Cattle

An additional animal disease listing is the [Colorado Reportable Disease List](#). A Colorado reportable disease is an infectious or contagious disease reportable to the State Veterinarian. An infectious or contagious disease is defined by the Colorado Revised Statues CRS 35-50-103 as a reportable or emerging disease of livestock that poses a significant risk to the livestock industry of the state resulting from infectious agents, such as viruses, rickettsia, bacteria, fungi, protozoa, internal or external parasites, or prions, or any reportable disease or emerging communicable disease that is capable of being transmitted from one animal to another animal or to a human, whether communicated directly or indirectly through an intermediate plant or livestock host, vector, or the environment. Colorado Reportable Diseases of Cattle are listed below.
2.3 Incident Command System and Response Levels

Since incidents will vary in size and scope, the level of activation will depend on the nature of the outbreak. Not all dairy cattle disease incidents will require local, state, or federal emergency response functions. Many incidents are handled routinely by private practice veterinarians and/or veterinarians employed by the State Veterinarian or USDA-APHIS-VS Veterinary Medical Officers (VMOs). The dairy industry has also invested time and resources in developing plans to deal with their own livestock incidents and situations.

In the event of a highly contagious disease outbreak in dairy cattle, the CDA will manage the incident using the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS provides standardized incident management processes, protocols, and procedures for all emergency responders. During an incident CDA will implement the Incident Command System (ICS), as mandated by NIMS. Designed to be a flexible all-hazard incident management tool, ICS allows decision makers to fill ICS positions to meet the complexities and demands of the incident. For example, a localized disease event of a short duration may only require the incident commander position to be filled; whereas a regional or more wide-spread disease outbreak may require all positions in an ICS incident organization chart to be filled. See Appendix C for an ICS incident organization chart designed for an animal disease outbreak in CDA’s authority and jurisdiction.

CDA will also follow NIMS incident typing and will respond to an animal health emergency using the activation levels described below. NIMS incident typing will assist decision makers in determining resources required for specific incidents. Table 1: Response Levels and National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Typing System summarizes level of response, lead agencies, and NIMS protocol for each level of response.

2.3.1 Level 5 Response

A level 5 response refers to a situation with little complexity that could be managed with one or two single resources. This level of response would be of a short duration and likely would consist of one 12-hour operational period or less.

- Anaplasmosis (clinical disease only)
- Anthrax
- Babesiosis
- Bluetongue (clinical disease only)
- Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
- Brucellosis
- Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease (EHD)
- Malignant Catarrhal Fever
- Any Vesicular Disease
- Any infectious disease or parasite of livestock not previously known to exist in Colorado
- Any disease of unusual morbidity or mortality than does not fit the normal expected clinical picture
- Paratuberculosis (Johnne’s Disease)
- Pseudorabies
- Rabies
- Scabies
- Screwworm
- Trichomoniasis
- Tuberculosis
- Vesicular Stomatitis
- Any suspected FAD
2.3.2 **Level 4 Response**

A level 4 response is normally limited to one 12-hour operational period and requires minor state resource input to manage the incident. This level of response does not require an incident action plan (IAP) and can be managed using the resources and personnel of the CDA Animal Health Division. Level 4 activities will include those identified for Level 5 in addition to the following:

- Increase animal origin verifications.
- Notify private practice veterinarians of specific clinical symptoms of the disease(s) in question.
- Notify USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office of the situation.
- Review of the CDA *Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan* in relation to potential response to the disease in question.
- Notification of dairy industry representative(s) of the disease outbreak and clinical symptoms.

2.3.3 **Level 3 Response**

A level 3 response reflects the elevated surveillance, preparation, and response that may be initiated by the state if there is a presumptive positive or confirmed diagnosis of a FAD in Colorado. A level 3 response may trigger activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and deployment of the Eastern Colorado Incident Management Team (ECIMT) or a similar State Type 3 Incident Management Team (IMT).

The ECIMT will be activated to support incident management for incidents that exceed departmental capability to manage the incident effectively. Type 3 IMTs are deployed as a team of 10-20 trained personnel to manage major and/or complex incidents requiring a significant number of local, regional, and state resources. A level 3 response may evolve into multiple operational periods that require a written IAP for each period. Level 3 activities will include those activities identified for all proceeding levels and may also include the following:

- Suspend the importation of cattle from affected or from potentially affected areas, or possibly all cattle from the impacted states, pending control and eradication of the disease.
- Inventory relevant state resources and review and implement contract mechanisms to support the logistics portion of the response.
- Review and update public relations materials and collaborate with key contributors in preparation for release. CDA and APHIS will be consulted for their message map on the appropriate disease, its implications for public health, animal health, and the livestock industry.

2.3.4 **Level 2 Response**

A level 2 response reflects a full-scale multi-state response that may require regional and/or national resources to effectively manage the incident. Level 2 activation is in response to a large, complex incident that will involve multiple operational periods. A written IAP is required for each operational period. A Rocky Mountain Type 2 or equivalent IMT may be deployed to support
management of the incident. A Type 2 IMT is deployed as a team of 20-35 to manage incidents of regional significance and other incidents requiring a large number of local, regional, state and national resources.

2.3.5 Level 1 Response

A level 1 response will be declared for the most complex incidents that require national resources to safely and effectively manage the incident. A level 1 response will be managed by a Type 1 IMT. A Type 1 IMT is deployed as a team of 35-50 to manage large national incidents and other incidents requiring a large number of local, regional, state, national, and federal resources over multiple operational periods.

Table 1. Response Levels and National Incident Management System Incident Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Level</th>
<th>NIMS Incident Type</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Emergency Response Actions*</th>
<th>Source of Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Level 5 – Local Response | Type 5 | CO Dept of Ag | - One 12hr. Operational Period  
- Incident action plan not required*  
- Emergency Operations Center not activated | Local |
| Level 4 – Limited State Response | Type 4 | CO Dept of Ag | - One 12hr. Operational Period  
- Incident action plan not required*  
- Emergency Operations Center not activated  
- ICS command and general | CDA Animal Industry Division  
- Federal |
| Level 3 – State Response | Type 3 | IMT Command with Unified Coordination:  
- CO Dept of Ag  
- USDS APHIS VS | - May extend into multiple operational periods  
- IAP may be required*  
- ICS some/all command and general positions activated  
- A Type III IMT like ECIMT will manage incident  
- State EOC may be activated | Local (Support)  
- State  
- Federal  
- May require regional resources |
| Level 2 – Multi-State Response | Type 2 | Joint or Unified Command And Unified Coordination. National, regional, and state coordination required | - Extends into multiple operational periods  
- IAP required  
- ICS some/all command and general positions activated  
- Rocky Mountain Type II or equivalent IMT will manage the incident.  
- State EOC activated | Local (Support)  
- State  
- Federal  
- Regional  
- May require national resources |
| Level 1 – National Response | Type 1 | National Unified Command and Coordination: National, regional, and state. | - Extends into multiple operational periods  
- IAP required for each operational periods  
- ICS all command and general positions activated  
- Type I IMT will manage incident  
- State EOC activated | Local (Support)  
- State  
- Federal  
- Regional  
- National |
2.4 Incident Complexity Analysis

The exact moment when an incident shifts from one level of complexity to the next is often a matter of perception. The State Veterinarian/Commissioner of Agriculture or designee must assess the complexity of an incident and authorize a level of response to meet the needs of the event. An Incident Complexity Analysis may be completed to assist in determining the appropriate level of response. The assessment tool consists of a series of questions regarding the incident and associated information that when answered will help determine the appropriate level of response and resources required to meet the needs of an incident. An example of an Incident Complexity Analysis worksheet is located in Appendix D.

2.5 Responder Health and Safety Program

A fundamental requirement for CDA is ensuring the safety of Department employees involved in responding to a disease outbreak. CDA developed the Responder Health and Safety program to meet this obligation. The CDA Responder Health and Safety Program is composed of three components:

1. Personal Protective Equipment Guidelines
2. CDA – Respiratory Protection Program
3. Medical Monitoring and Rehabilitation.

Combined, these documents and programs provide a means to assess employee fitness for emergency work, provide for personal health protection via the use of protective equipment and decontamination procedures, monitor vital signs, and provide support to assure employees maintain fitness levels needed to conduct assigned activities.

2.5.1 Personal Protective Equipment

This General Guidance Document provides a plan to be followed to assure a safe working environment while allowing flexibility to meet varying needs that might be expected in a livestock emergency environment. The guidance is just that, guidelines that incident commanders, operations section chiefs, Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) veterinarians, team or task force leaders or the like can utilize in assessing and deciding upon equipment and procedures they will utilize when conducting their assigned missions. See Appendix E for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) guidance for zoonotic and non-zoonotic diseases.

Initially, when the causative agent is unknown, high levels of protection may be used. Once the agent is identified, levels of protection can be adjusted (usually decreased) to fit specific challenges an agent might pose. Once the disease agent has been identified, it is likely the level of protection will be similar to employer placed biosecurity programs.
Of special note is the fact Colorado is a “non-Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)” state. This means state employees are not subject to the same regulations as are production facilities and their respective employees. The CDA program has essentially been placed to close this gap. Even so, producers remain responsible to follow appropriate OSHA programs related to their facilities. State employees cannot provide any equipment or certain training to private employees, although they may recommend general levels of PPE to be utilized for different operational activities.

2.5.2 Respiratory Protection Program

A respiratory protection program is important, especially during a disease outbreak. Respiratory protection becomes essential when there are potential health risks from respiratory exposure to the disease agent, to chemicals used in cleaning and disinfection, and to risks inherently present on livestock operations. Individuals who may be deployed to an incident are required to have completed a medical questionnaire that has been reviewed and approved by a medical doctor familiar with such programs. These individuals have been trained and fit tested to utilize specific respiratory equipment. Production facilities may or may not have similar programs in place. It is anticipated if they do not, employees could still work in less hazardous areas or accommodations could be made to have employees trained and tested for such activity.

2.5.3 Medical Monitoring and Rehabilitation

Emergency response often requires long hours doing strenuous work in adverse conditions and environments. Physical exertion can lead to dehydration or exacerbation of environmental factors such as heat or cold conditions. It is essential that responders be medically fit and cleared to work in such conditions. Individuals with underlying medical problems (such as a preexisting cardiac issue) who work in such challenging situations can place themselves at risk for debilitating injuries or even death. Medical monitoring affords an opportunity to identify underlying problems and hopefully mitigate them before they become quite serious. Such monitoring occurs when risks exist and is conducted both prior to assignment and throughout the assigned work period. Rehabilitation periods are scheduled to allow responders a break in which to rest, rehydrate and get something to eat if need be.

Production workers generally have scheduled breaks to eat or drink. These may need to be extended and rehydration beverages or food provided dependent upon work schedules and on environmental factors such as temperature and humidity. Medical monitoring of facility employees might possibly be arranged via local public health or emergency medical service departments.

2.6 Communication Plan

Effective emergency management response depends on communication – the ability to maintain a common operating picture through the constant flow and sharing of information. Integrated communication forges a link among operational and support units to enable common awareness of the incident and actions to achieve the objectives of Incident Command. Equipment, systems, protocols, and expertise are needed to achieve this integration. Procedures and protocols
governing communication among the emergency responders must be established in advance of an outbreak.

The objectives of the communication plan in the face of an animal disease emergency are as follows:

- Furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information
- Maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the State’s ability to respond to an outbreak
- Minimize public panic and fear;
- Address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible; and
- Inform the public and producer what they can do to mitigate the disease or event in their lives and in their production systems

The goals, which will help to achieve the communication objectives, are as follows:

- Establish a network of stakeholders and systems for communication, prior to an incident or outbreak
- Test or exercise the systems for communication at regular intervals, prior to an outbreak
- Brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others on the outbreak and the actions being taken by the CDA, USDA, and other partners to control, contain, and eradicate the disease
- Highlight the importance of good biosecurity practices and steps that producers and owners can take to protect against infection
- Coordinate with USDA, HHS, DOI, DHS, State agencies, local agencies, Tribal entities, and CSU and CSU Extension to ensure a consistent message regarding animal health, public health, and food safety

2.6.1 Incident Command Structure: Communication

The figure below indicates which ICS positions will have a role in communication activity:
The PIO will develop an external communications strategy, which the Incident Commander must approve before implementation. This plan should include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designated line and staff responsibilities for the information teams</th>
<th>Response team after-hours contact numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal information verification and approval procedures</td>
<td>Response team after-hours contact numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements on information release authorities, including who releases what, when, and how</td>
<td>Responsibility for emergency response information partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and local media contact list</td>
<td>Procedures to secure needed resources to operate the public information and media operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and fund an 800 hotline number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures to coordinate with field response teams</td>
<td>Agreements and procedures to join the JIC, if activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles of information dissemination</td>
<td>Key messages to stakeholder groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.2 External Communications Planning:

External communication during an outbreak will be the responsibility of the State Veterinarian and the CDA Director of Communications and Public Awareness. The State Veterinarian, with assistance from the CDA Liaison Officer will direct and maintain communication with federal, state, and local government agencies and partners that have a statutory responsibility in emergency response. Additionally, the CDA Communication Director will communicate and collaborate with livestock industry representatives throughout the incident.

The WDA Crisis communication plan will serve as a guide for industry when communicating with the public through an animal health emergency. The WDA Crisis Communication Plan contains...
key messages, roles, and responsibilities and industry contact lists that will serve as an important external and internal communication resource during an incident.

Specific beef industry representatives who would be included in the communication planning would be – Colorado Livestock Association (CLA), Colorado Cattlemen’s Association (CCA), Farm Bureau, and dairy associations such as the Western Dairy Association (WDA) and Dairy Farmers of America (DFA). In a situation where the disease affecting cattle would also affect other livestock species such as pigs, sheep, and goats those associations would also be included (Colorado Pork Producers Council, Colorado Woolgrowers Association, and goat breed associations).

Correspondence and communication with the media and public regarding the incident will be directed and managed by the CDA Director of Communications. The CDA Director of Communications or assigned designate may assume the ICS role of Public Information Officer (PIO) upon activation of this plan. In the event the ECIMT or another IMT is deployed to manage the incident, the CDA PIO shall work in collaboration with the IMT, State EOC, State and local public health, livestock associations and dairy industry, federal agencies and local emergency management PIO(s) in a Joint Information Center (JIC).

2.6.3 Internal Communications Planning:
The Colorado Department of Agriculture has guidance documents available on SharePoint for internal communication processes.

The 5 W’s of Critical Information Sharing:

1. What do we know? 4. Who has the information?
2. Who needs to know it? 5. What will we do to get the information out?
3. What do they need to know?

- Division Crisis Communication Plan
- Incident Report using the ABCD Template which helps to initially organize needed components of the disease response.
  - A = Assessment
  - B = Briefings
  - C = Communication
  - D = Delegate roles and responsibilities
  - Includes section “Brief and Communicate to”
- Disease Response Checklist, Day 0; and Post Confirmation Checklist
  - Outlines initial communication contacts
- Emergency Response Contact List
  - Contact names and phone numbers for each pertinent agency
- Incident Action Plan
  - Form ICS 205 and ICS 205a for communication plans
- Animal Emergency Response Communication Retrieval Process
Process for logging messages from internal staff cell phones, desk phones, email, and assignment of personnel to return phone calls and emails

- Office Messaging Template
  - Narrative for office and field staff to use; includes: messaging to use within CDA, phone recording, email response, and website

3.0 Disease Outbreak Response

This section describes the processes and protocols utilized by the CDA during a disease outbreak affecting dairy cattle. These processes and protocols are designed to enable execution of the responsibilities of the CDA and to integrate federal, state, local, and industry efforts into an effective and coordinated approach to a disease outbreak in dairy cattle. Responding to a disease outbreak in dairy cattle will involve the actions described below. Table 2. Timeline for Disease Control Response Activities provides a timeline for each action phase.

- **Disease Detection**: Investigate suspected animal disease and initiate movement restrictions
- **Disease Control**: Quarantine infected and exposed premises and control movement of dairy cattle and dairy products
- **Surveillance**: Develop a surveillance plan based on epidemiological investigation
- **Epidemiology**: Determine the extent of the outbreak and/or confirm non-infected status
- **Stabilization**: Control, prevent spread, and, as possible, eradicate disease
- **Business Continuity**: Protect economic viability and continuity of operations
- **Recovery**: Return affected premises to normal business operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease Outbreak Response Actions* †</th>
<th>12 hours</th>
<th>24 Hours</th>
<th>48 Hours</th>
<th>24 Hours</th>
<th>72 Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Within a confirmed positive case</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Within a confirmed positive case</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within determination of need</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within determination of need</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disease Control -- Quarantine Infected and Exposed Premises and Control Movement of Animals</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilize livestock disease-related incident command personal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish initial control areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhance biosecurity procedures on infected, contact and susceptible premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish quarantine zones for infected and contacted premises and/ or broader movement restrictions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surveillance -- Develop Surveillance Plan Based on Epidemiological Investigation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a surveillance plan and implement existing diagnostic support.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Epidemiology -- Determine the Extent of the Outbreak and / Or Confirmed Non-Infected Status</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement epidemiological surveillance and diagnostic support plan in at-risk species and notify other states of trace-outs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilization -- Control, Prevent Spread of, and, as Possible, Eradicate Disease</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Begin treatment, inoculation, and /or depopulation of animals at identified site.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Begin decontamination and disposal procedures at identified site.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Business Continuity -- Protect Economic Viability and Continuity of Operations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement procedures for the creation of bio-secure transportation corridors to market or other key facilities for disease –free goods and animals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop procedures for managing contaminated products.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish storage and /or disposal areas for animals or products stopped in transit.</td>
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</table>
* Disease Detection and Recovery Actions are not in the scope of the above timeline.  
† Communication with neighboring states will be initiated within 4 hours of a confirmed positive case. |          |          |          |          |         |
4.0 Disease Detection: Investigations and Initiate Movement Restrictions

Rapid detection of reportable diseases is essential to minimize spread and impact on the industry and local economy. Timeliness of the initial response is critical. In most situations a private and/or accredited veterinarian will be the first to encounter a foreign animal disease (FAD) and they are required by law to report any suspected FAD. Once a suspect case is identified, an FAD investigator will be dispatched to collect samples. If there is adequate suspicion that an FAD is present he/she can place a verbal hold order. This hold order will then be converted to a quarantine if the samples come back confirmed positive by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL). During this time the CDA will begin activating the emergency response plan outlined in this document.

4.1 Foreign Animal Disease Investigation

Upon notification of a suspected case of FAD, the Colorado State Veterinarian or USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office will dispatch a FAD Diagnostician (FADD) to conduct a FAD Investigation. See CDA website for VMO territories in Colorado: https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/VMO%20Map%20Colorado.pdf

The investigation is conducted using a standardized format developed by USDA. Information and data collected during the FAD Investigation includes a general assessment, number and species of livestock present, gathering site information, samples, and epidemiological data. In addition, the FADD collects the following information about the facility:

- Premises Identification Number (PIN) or USAHERDS Location ID (LID)
- Type of facility
- Plat map description
- GPS Coordinates
- Type and number of buildings
- Available resources
- Number of personnel or employees

The goal of the investigation is to confirm or rule out the presence of disease in a rapid and efficient manner. As such, the FADD examines the animals on site and packages the appropriate diagnostic samples for delivery to a state and federal diagnostic laboratory – refer to the FAD Investigation Manual and FAD PReP Disease Response Documents for protocols on submission of samples. Information from the investigation is reported to the State Veterinarian who, in consultation with the FADD and the USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office, determines the classification and diagnostics sample prioritization (defined below). This decision is critical and determines turnaround times on diagnostic samples and aids in establishing appropriate disease control measures. The priority established will determine where the samples are sent, how they are handled for transportation, and the level of response the lab gives the samples. Operations in the collection, shipping, and management of laboratory samples shall be in accordance with the USDA-APHIS-VS protocol for FAD Investigations.

- Priority 1: High Suspicion of FAD and needs rapid or extraordinary methods for sample collection, submission and transport. Testing is conducted immediately upon arrival.
• **Priority 2**: Intermediate Suspicion of FAD and needs rapid methods for sample collection, submission and transport. Testing is conducted as necessary according to business hours.

• **Priority 3**: Low Suspicion of FAD and needs routine methods for sample collection, submission and transport. Testing is conducted in accession order.

• **Priority A**: Intermediate or Low Suspicion of FAD but circumstances of investigation indicate needs rapid methods for collection, submission and transport. Testing conducted immediately upon arrival.

In most cases, preliminary results are available within 24 hours. However, during the investigation, the State Veterinarian may implement certain movement restrictions for livestock and dairy or other products. Decisions relative to movement controls would be based on the general clinical assessment, morbidity and mortality of the disease outbreak, and the risk to other livestock facilities. A description of zones, areas, and premises used for restricting movement is located in Section 5.

### 4.2 Hold Order

There are three possible outcomes of an FAD Investigation: (1) negative, (2) presumptive positive, or (3) confirmed positive. In the event a FAD is suspected as the initial outcome of the FAD Investigation, the State Veterinarian may issue a hold order as authorized by CRS 35-50-103 to restrict animal movement. CRS 35-50-103 defines a hold order as “a temporary order issued by the state veterinarian when an infectious disease is suspected in livestock to isolate any specific livestock premises, county, district; and specify sanitary measures, pending completion of testing.” The State Veterinarian may authorize the hold order through accredited veterinarians or through another appointed official.

### 4.3 Quarantine

A preliminary/presumptive positive test result must be confirmed by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL). Once the appropriate NVSL lab has verified the testing results are a confirmed positive, the State Veterinarian as the Commissioner of Agriculture’s designee may place the infected premises under quarantine. CRS 35-50-103 defines quarantine as “an order issued by the commissioner when testing has confirmed the presence of an infectious or contagious disease in livestock, which order isolates specific livestock, premises, counties, districts, or sections of the state; restricts the movement of livestock; and specifies sanitary measures.”

### 4.4 Response Plan Activation Sequence

The activation of an emergency plan is at the discretion of the State Veterinarian. Upon confirmation of a presumptive positive test result of a highly contagious animal disease, from the Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (CSU-VDL) or NVSL, the State Veterinarian will activate the CDA Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan.

The State Veterinarian will immediately contact the Commissioner of Agriculture, Deputy Commissioner, the USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office, along with other collaborative response agencies/partners as necessary, and relay all known information on the positive test notification.
The State Veterinarian should be prepared to make recommendations with respect to any gubernatorial declarations and/or activation of the state EOC (SEOC) and appropriate level of response. Specifically, the State Veterinarian will relay the following information:

- Name and contact information of the verifying laboratory official reporting the confirmatory test
- Name(s) and location(s) of the infected premises including Global Positioning System (GPS) and USAHERDS Location ID (LID) and/or Federal Premises Identification Number (PIN) if available.
- Type of production facility and number of dairy cattle on the infected premises.

If notification of a presumptive positive or confirmed positive of a highly contagious animal disease occurs after normal working hours, on a weekend, or holiday, the State Veterinarian will communicate with the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, the USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office, and the necessary staff of the Animal Health Division of CDA at their afterhours contact numbers. Based on direction from the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, and Assistant Director of USDA-APHIS-VS District 6 Colorado Office, the State Veterinarian will take appropriate action to activate the response level based on incident type. See Table 1. Response Levels and National Incident Management System Incident Typing System.

5.0 Disease Containment: Quarantine and Movement Control

Upon confirmation of a suspected or confirmed case of a highly infectious animal disease, the State Veterinarian will implement a series of response actions to control the spread of disease and minimize the impact of an outbreak. Although actions will vary based on the disease agent, the following section presents a series of possible control activities that may be used to contain a highly infectious disease in dairy cattle.

5.1 Movement Restrictions

Movement restrictions for dairy cattle, dairy products, vehicles, and possibly people may be used to prevent further spread of disease. Once an outbreak has been confirmed, the Infected Premises (IP) will be placed under quarantine (see Section 4.3 for additional information on livestock quarantines). Diseased or disease-exposed dairy cattle will need to remain on the IP until the necessary control measures are determined by the State Veterinarian. A Control Zone, which includes any Contact Premises (CP - farms or areas with a connection to the Infected Premises), will be established.

Road blocks and/or check points (See 11.2.3.2 Colorado State Patrol (CSP)) and possibly decontamination stations may be needed at ingress and egress locations in the Control Area. Additional zones may be designated to control and monitor the disease. Descriptions and a diagram of Premises, Zones, and Area designations follow in Section 5.2. See section 9.1 for additional information regarding Controlled Animal Movement.

5.2 Premises, Zones, and Area Designations

The designation of Control Areas and Zones is essential to successful quarantine and movement
control activities. The State Veterinarian shall determine premises classification in the event of a presumptive positive or confirmed case of a highly contagious livestock disease. He/she shall work with the USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office and FADD veterinarians, emergency response teams, the state EOC, law enforcement, and other local and state agencies/entities to establish area and zone designations that will allow for the identification, implementation and enforcement of quarantine and movement controls. Table 3 and Table 4 summarize designations used in a response. Figure 1 gives a visual representation of the zones and areas described in Table 3 and Table 4.

Table 3. Summary of Premises Designations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premises</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infected Premises (IP)</td>
<td>Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, HPAI case definition, and international standards.</td>
<td>Infected Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Premises (CP)</td>
<td>Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to HPAI, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Premises (SP)</td>
<td>Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with HPAI. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, Surveillance Zone, Vaccination Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Risk Premises (ARP)</td>
<td>Premises with susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with HPAI. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitored Premises (MP)</td>
<td>Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Premises (FP)</td>
<td>Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises.</td>
<td>Surveillance Zone, Free Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccinated Premises (VP)</td>
<td>Premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This may be a secondary premises designation.</td>
<td>Containment Vaccination Zone, Protection Vaccination Zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Summary of Zone and Area Designations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone/Area</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infected Zone (IZ)</td>
<td>Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer Zone (BZ)</td>
<td>Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Area (CA)</td>
<td>Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance Zone (SZ)</td>
<td>Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Area (FA)</td>
<td>Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccination Zone (VZ)</td>
<td>Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone (typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from: FAD PReP Dairy Industry Manual, Jan 2012, Section 6

Figure 1. Example of Zones, Areas, & Premises in an FMD Outbreak Response

5.3 Biosecurity and Disease Control Measures

USDA-APHIS-VS defines biosecurity as the use of certain management practices designed to prevent the introduction and spread of disease. Good biosecurity can mitigate the spread of the disease once it has been introduced into a herd or area. Biosecurity target areas for a dairy facility are site security and traffic control, isolation of animals, and sanitation. Most dairy producers already incorporate biosecurity measures into their daily operations as part of normal cattle health and management practices.

Example biosecurity measures for FMD in dairy facilities are located in the National Secure Milk
During a health emergency in dairy cattle, the State Veterinarian may prescribe additional biosecurity measures for premises located in defined zones for each of the infected premises. Biosecurity measures will be dependent upon the disease and its mode(s) of transmission.

Biosecurity measures will be required and evaluated, even for uninfected premises in the Control Area and other areas of the state, for producers to be able to maintain continuity of business (ability to move raw milk – see the Colorado Secure Milk Supply Plan).

5.3.1 Site Security

Any site that is under investigation as an Infected Premises, a Suspect Premises, or a Contact Premises shall take steps to prevent all non-essential traffic from entering the premises. All traffic should be prohibited except for essential personnel. Essential personnel are defined as having a direct role in the care and feeding of cattle or a direct role in the emergency response. Site security procedures that may be recommended include:

- Establish one ingress and one egress location into and from the facility. All other access points must be blocked or gates locked to prevent unregulated entry or exit from the facility. If possible, the ingress and egress location should be located on a level and solid surface with access to water (by hose or tanker truck) for cleaning and disinfection purposes. Vehicles transporting workers or supplies may need to park at the access gate and shuttle people and supplies in through a safe corridor system or transport on foot – exceptions would be large truck transport vehicles.
- Cease all non-essential work on the farm and restrict access to the facility to essential personnel only. All vehicles and equipment on the premises may be prohibited from leaving the premises unless approved by the State Veterinarian. All vehicles leaving the premises will likely be required to be cleaned and disinfected.
- Require all essential personnel to wear PPE determined at a level necessary to protect or prevent the spread of disease and to mitigate any zoonotic disease potential. Personnel entering the premises will be required to wear disposable or adequately cleaned and disinfected boots, coveralls, gloves, head/hair covering, and possibly masks. The level of protection will be determined by the specific disease agent and area and nature of work individuals are to engage in. PPE must be donned prior to entry onto the premises, or a specified area therein, and must be removed and thoroughly disinfected or disposed of prior to leaving.
- Maintain a log of all movement onto and off of the premises. Verify premises log book is complete. Deliveries for farm essentials shall be by appointment only.
Establishing decontamination procedures for vehicles and personnel leaving a premises are designed to prevent the spread of disease from an infected flock and premises. Cleaning and disinfection procedures are essential both during and after an animal disease event. Materials that should be available at the designated entry/exit point on the infected premises includes: brushes, buckets, hoses, water, disinfectant, and a pressure washer. Cleaning and disinfection must be performed on all personnel, equipment, and vehicles leaving the infected premises or control area. A comprehensive EPA chart of diseases and approved disinfectants is provided on the USDA-APHIS Animal Health Emergency Management website. Cleaning and disinfection procedures that may be required by the State Veterinarian include:

- Establishing a designated decontamination area/corridor on the premises. This is an area where personnel, vehicles, and equipment will undergo cleaning and decontamination before leaving the premises. This area should be close to the entry/exit point, on a hard surface and have access to water.
- Establishing a designated area for personnel to don and doff personal protective equipment and protocols for disposing of or treating contaminated personal protective equipment.
- Establishing a pest, especially rodent, control program.

5.3.3 Wildlife Management

If an animal disease outbreak has potential wildlife impacts or can be spread by wildlife, the Colorado Parks and Wildlife (CPW) will collaborate and lead all appropriate wildlife response activities. Two important questions to ask are: “Are there sick wildlife?” and “Can wildlife carry this disease to another premises?” Section 11.2 provides additional information on the CPW role in an animal disease outbreak.

5.3.4 Public Health Involvement

If an animal disease outbreak is identified as a zoonotic disease and has potential public health impacts, the State Veterinarian or other designated representative of the CDA will contact the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) to seek assistance to protect the public’s health. An important question to ask is, “Are there people with potential exposure to the disease agent getting sick?” If so, CDPHE and/or local health departments will be involved and will conduct their own epidemiologic investigation. Section 11.2 provides additional information on the CDPHE’s role in an animal disease outbreak.

6.0 Surveillance: Develop Surveillance Plan Based on Epidemiologic Investigation

Surveillance is a critical activity during a disease outbreak. The response goals include: (1) to implement surveillance plans within 48 hours of the confirmation of an outbreak; (2) to implement a surveillance plan that will define the present extent of the disease and detect unknown infected premises quickly; and (3) to develop surveillance plans that can achieve desired outcomes by leveraging available resources, satisfying jurisdictional requirements, and implementing
continuity of business measures.

Animal disease surveillance activities involve collecting and interpreting data from animal populations to determine their health status regarding diseases of concern. Surveillance programs are currently in place to assist in rapid detection of an animal disease incursion. Active surveillance techniques are also used in an animal disease response to determine the extent of a disease known to be present, and during the recovery phase of a response to provide the necessary evidence for the elimination of the disease.

Surveillance methods that may be used during a disease outbreak include inspecting animals for clinical signs of the disease and diagnostic testing. Inspection of animals for clinical signs involves observing animals for any clinical presentation of the disease. Surveillance information is also obtained through the collection and testing of various biological samples from all dairy herds within certain distances of Infected Premises, regardless of clinical appearance. The biological samples required will vary depending on the disease agent. Possible biological samples include: blood, skin scrapings, fecal material, tissue, and necropsy of dead cattle.

The speed at which these actions occur will have a direct effect on the extent and thus the outcome of an outbreak. Once control areas, zones, and premises are identified, a surveillance plan for each area or zone will be developed by the State Veterinarian. The surveillance plan will include information on methods to collect, manage, and analyze animal health data. Since each animal disease outbreak is unique, the surveillance plan will be tailored to the event and disease agent. Guidance on surveillance is available from the following resources:

- NAHEMS Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing
- FAD PReP SOP: Surveillance
- FAD PReP Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book
- Secure Beef Supply Surveillance Guidance Document

7.0 Epidemiology: Determine Extent of Outbreak and/or Confirm Non-Infected Status

To respond quickly and effectively to an animal disease event, the CDA animal health officials need to know which animals are involved, where they are located, and what other animals might have been exposed. The sooner reliable data is available, affected animals can be located, appropriate response measures can be established, and disease spread can be halted.

7.1 Disease Trace-Back and Trace-Forward

An important component of an animal disease outbreak investigation is to establish trace-forward and trace-backs from premises to determine both the source of the disease and the risk for disease transmission to other premises with susceptible species. Trace-backs and trace-forwards are usually applied from a minimum or 2 times the maximum incubation period prior to the onset of clinical signs until the time quarantine is imposed.
Trace-backs are conducted to assist in identifying the source of the virus or pathogenic microbes and to help determine how the disease was introduced to the facility. Trace-back procedures include collecting information from producers on the origins of all dairy cattle (and possibly other animals), dairy products, feed, equipment and vehicles (livestock trucks, feed trucks, veterinary trucks), and people (sales and feed representatives, visitors, veterinarians and brand inspectors) that have visited the farm prior to the outbreak.

Trace-forward procedures gather similar information on animal, people, and equipment movements off the farm to identify other premises that received potentially infected animals, contaminated animal products, or equipment.

Trace-backs are usually applied for a minimum of 2 times the maximum incubation period of the diagnosed disease before the onset of clinical signs. Table 5 provides an example of vehicle and personnel movement onto dairy operations, but it is important for each premises to evaluate their own movements and records associated with those movements.

**Table 5. Type and Frequency of Vehicle/Personnel Movement onto Dairy Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Seasonal/Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>Milk equipment repair personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk hauler</td>
<td>Feed delivery</td>
<td>Nutritionist</td>
<td>Feed, equipment, seed and pharmaceutical sales personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calf pick up</td>
<td>Calf pick up</td>
<td>Heifer delivery</td>
<td>Hoof trimmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproduction technician (artificial insemination)</td>
<td>Reproduction technician (artificial insemination)</td>
<td>Dairy cooperative field representative</td>
<td>Embryo transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cull cattle buyer</td>
<td>Cull cattle buyer</td>
<td>Manure removal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rendering</td>
<td>Diesel fuel delivery</td>
<td>Propane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply delivery (towels, dips, milk liners, vaccines)</td>
<td>Garbage pick up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Utility meter reader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Producers may be required to participate in a traceability system. Accurate tracing investigations are critical to determining the magnitude of an outbreak and halting the spread of the disease.

It is recommended that producers maintain up-to-date herd records. Among other advantages, accurate herd records assist in the completion of timely trace-forward and trace-back investigations. The following are some types of records that may be traced during a disease investigation:

- **Herd Inventory**: Herd information, specifically: animal ID, breed, age, species, and origin. Animals that die or are culled from the herd should be identified.

- **Herd Movement**: Animal movement to-and-from the farm logs, such as: date of movement, animal identification, origin, destination, reason, driver, vehicle used, previous owner name, and contact information. Cull animals/steers sold number, date, and location.

- **Milk Movement**: Milk movement logs (date, batch identification, origin, destination, driver, tankers used). Tanker information including driver, tanker used, dates, origins, and destinations.

- **Raw Milk Samples**: Records of off-site milk testing laboratories that have received raw milk samples including the method of transport and disposal of sample waste.

- **Farm Services**: Visitor logs with names, phone number, reason for visit, time since last contact with livestock, and facilities entered. Visitors include all non-employees (veterinarians, brand inspectors, health inspection personnel, feed salesman, inseminators, livestock dealers, repairmen, neighbors, etc.) May also include equipment, feed, semen/embryo movement logs (dates, origin, application site, volume, and application method. Effluent disposal information if moved off-site may also be traced.

- **Animal Health Information**: Vaccination and treatment records including animal ID, date, reason for treatment/vaccination, and medication (product used). Records of any postmortem examination and/or testing of any dead stock by the producer or veterinarian should be maintained and made available for review.

- **Farm Employees**: Employee record (name, address, phone number, and does the employee have contact with other livestock).

- **Pets and Animals**: Pets and other animals located on the premises.

7.2 **USAHERDS Animal Health Information Management System**

USAHERDS is the animal health information management system within the Animal Health Division of the Colorado Department of Agriculture. It is a repository of Colorado livestock premises data, animal IDs, and livestock movement information that can be accessed and utilized during an animal disease outbreak to assist in the tracing of dairy cattle and premises. Data for the USAHERDS database is received from dairy operations and from existing data sources and
integrated into one system that can be accessed by CDA animal health officials during an animal emergency. USAHERDS enables CDA to respond quickly and to prevent disease at unaffected facilities when a significant disease event may impact their area or the species of dairy cattle they own or manage.

7.3 Dairy Operations and Traceability

The highly integrated structure of many commercial dairy operations may significantly improve the level of traceability and communication within the dairy industry. Such contracts and business arrangements could be utilized to efficiently and effectively improve biosecurity, prevent further spread of the disease, and to mitigate the negative impact to the dairy industry. CDA is committed to working with the industry and associations to provide for good business continuity of operations. (See section 9 for further discussion of continuity of operations)

8.0 Stabilization: Control, Prevent Spread, and Eradicate Animal Disease

Elimination, if possible, of a highly contagious disease involves a series of activities that will be implemented by the State Veterinarian in collaboration with the USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office personnel. Actions taken will be based on the particular circumstances of the outbreak including: the disease agent, epidemiology of the disease, and vaccine and resource availability. Descriptions of possible response actions to eliminate an animal disease (and sources of equipment and materials used to carry out these actions) are described in the following section.

8.1 Appraisal and Indemnity

According to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 9CFR 53.3 a percentage of fair market value will be paid to the owners for livestock that must be depopulated or materials that must be destroyed to prevent the spread of an animal disease.

Additionally, CRS 35-50-113 grants the CDA Commissioner the authority, under certain circumstances and upon the recommendation of the State Veterinarian, to authorize the payment of indemnity to any livestock owner whose herd is depopulated due to exposure or diagnosis with an infectious or contagious disease although State indemnity funds are extremely limited.

With federal qualifying events, the federal appraisal and indemnification process outlined in 9 CFR 53.3 is the most efficient appraisal process for livestock owners. The process outlined in CRS 35-50-113 can be used in situations where depopulation of livestock is deemed necessary by the Commissioner and the State Veterinarian, but are not identified as federal qualifying events. For both processes, valuation of livestock must be mutually agreed upon by the owner and state or federal officials prior to depopulation. Under certain situations this may require physical appraisal of livestock.

In previous highly infectious disease outbreaks, the USDA paid for the cost of euthanasia, carcass disposal, and decontamination. Colorado will follow USDA procedures to request assistance with indemnification of dairy producers in response to an eligible disease event.

8.2 Depopulation
CRS 35-50-113 authorizes the State Veterinarian to order euthanasia, mass depopulation, and carcass disposal to mitigate an animal disease in Colorado and is an integral part of a comprehensive response plan. In the event that a highly contagious animal disease in dairy cattle is confirmed in the state of Colorado, dairy cattle depopulation and carcass disposal may represent the most effective means of disease control and eradication. If deemed necessary by the State Veterinarian to contain a disease outbreak, the CDA will take every measure to ensure rapid and humane depopulation of all dairy cattle affected by the disease outbreak. The State Veterinarian will develop a comprehensive depopulation and disposal plan based on guidance from the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) Guidelines on Euthanasia, National Agricultural Biosecurity Center, Kansas State University, industry capabilities, and other available resources.

The State Veterinarian’s depopulation plan will be dependent upon the type, number, and size of cattle to be depopulated. Table 6. Methods of Depopulation Appropriate for Dairy Cattle provides an overview of the approved methods of depopulation for cattle. Table 7. Considerations for Approved Depopulation Methods for Cattle provides an overview of the advantages, disadvantages, and considerations for human safety for depopulation methods appropriate for cattle.

It is important to consider depopulation methods in conjunction with carcass disposal options. Carcass disposal will be carried out in collaboration with the CDPHE as defined in the CDA/CDPHE joint Interagency Agreement (IA), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), state statutes, and state rules/regulations. Additional information on carcass disposal is located in Section 8.3.

The AVMA Guidelines for the Depopulation of Animals is currently under development and will be a useful resource for development of a depopulation plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Methods of Depopulation Appropriate for Dairy Cattle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gun Shot</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Shot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetrating Captive Bolt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrocution (Head to Heart)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.2.1 Gunshot
Gunshot to the brain is an AVMA approved method to euthanize cattle. The caliber, projectile, and propellant load should be appropriate for the species. Full metal jacket ammunition should never be used. Muzzle energy charts should be used to determine the appropriate caliber and type of ammunition for the size and type of animal. Appropriate muzzle energy is 300 foot-pounds of force for animals up to 400 pounds and 1000 foot-pounds of force for animals over 400 pounds.

8.2.2 Penetrating Captive Bolt

The AVMA has approved the penetrating captive bolt as a possible form of euthanasia for cattle. This is a gun like device that is placed against the skull of the animal and when fired a rod (bolt) in the gun is forced into the skull and into the brain tissue. The rod is attached to the gun and taken out when the skull is penetrated. It is strongly recommended that an adjunct measure such as exsanguinations or “pithing” be administered to ensure death. This method is practical for numerous animals, and is especially useful for animals over 200 pounds.

8.2.3 Electrocution

This is a two-step process in which the first step passes electricity through the brain and stuns the animal. The second step passes electricity through the body and stops the heart. This method is very dangerous to personnel, requires special equipment, and an electrically safe environment in which to conduct such activity. For cattle, electrocution as a depopulation method should only be applied using specialized slaughter plant equipment that applies a minimum of 2.5 amp across the brain. A 120 volt electrical cord does not apply sufficient amperage to induce unconsciousness.

8.2.4 Barbiturates

Barbiturates and pentobarbital combinations are used to depress the central nervous system, causing deep anesthesia that progresses to respiratory and cardiac arrest. This method is considered to be very humane but it does require intravenous injection into the animal and would render the carcasses unacceptable for rendering.

Table 7. Considerations for Approved Depopulation Methods for Dairy Cattle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depopulation Method</th>
<th>Human Safety Risk</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Gun Shot            | Bullet poses considerable risk | Recommended for animals that cannot be restrained or are difficult to handle. | - May not kill animal
- May present biosecurity risk from leaking body fluids
- May preclude evaluation of brain if damaged by shooting | - Skilled and licensed operator
- Appropriate firearm and ammunition for cattle
- .22 caliber ‘long rifle’ for calves |
| Penetrating Captive Bolt | Moderate | - Safer for operator than free bullet method  
- Reduces the need to move animals | - May be a two-step process based on size  
- Misplaced captive bolt gun may compromise animal welfare  
- Captive bolt gun must be maintained, cleaned  
- Several must be used to reduce overheating | - Different sizes of captive bolt guns for different size cattle. |
|--------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Electrocution            | High - requires considerable operator knowledge | - No tissue or blood exposure  
- physically demanding for operator  
- Requires monitoring to ensure | - Restrain is necessary  
- Two-step process for large animals | - Electrical supply  
- Electrodes |
| Barbiturates             | Low      | - Humane & rapid killing of animals              | - Animals must be restrained  
- Administered by a trained professional  
- Limited access to drugs | - Syringes & needles  
- Drug to be injected |

Sources: American Veterinary Medical Association. AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia, 2007;  
American Association of Bovine Practitioners, Practical Euthanasia of Cattle: Considerations for the  
Producer, Livestock Market Operator, Livestock Transporter, and Veterinarian, 1999;  

8.3 Disposal

All-Hazards Event: Large quantities of animal carcasses that result from an all-hazards event (blizzard, flood, tornado, etc.), any disease-related mass deaths of livestock, or an event in which the State Veterinarian determines that depopulation of animals is required, must be managed in a manner that prevents the spread of infection and contamination of soil and ground water. During these events, the CDA is the lead agency and will direct all activities related to management and disposal of carcass wastes. The CDA and CDPHE have a MOU that provides guidance related to the roles and responsibilities associated with a mass mortality or depopulation event. The MOU, Regarding Storage, Treatment or Disposal of Livestock Carcasses During any All-Hazards Event, is available on the CDPHE website: https://www.colorado.gov/cdphe/swguidance. Agricultural waste such as livestock that died in a natural disaster or disease outbreak are covered within the CDA-CDPHE MOU on disposal of livestock mass mortalities due to an all-hazards event. Such waste is exempted from the CDPHE composting regulations.

Other Events: Carcasses that are disposed of due to mortality or disease unrelated to an all-hazards event or that cannot be used for their original intended purposes are considered to be a solid waste and must be managed in compliance with the Colorado Solid Waste Act (30-20-100.5 et.seq., C.R.S.) and its implementing regulations (6 CCR 1007-2, Part 1). Be aware that under these regulations, special requirements apply to animals known or suspected of being contaminated with infectious substances contagious to humans.
Local Ordinances: The local or county governments may also have regulations and ordinances regarding the proper management of carcasses. Therefore, contact the local public health department concerning local ordinances for disposal. Inappropriate management of these wastes may spread infection or cause contamination of the soil or ground water.

The goal of disposal is to facilitate the decomposition of carcasses and to destroy any pathogenic disease agent present. Proper disposal is an essential component of the eradication of a disease outbreak. Methods utilized should limit the potential for spread of the disease, or exposure of susceptible species to disease, and limit any potential adverse environmental impact. Commonly used disposal methods include: burial, composting, incineration, alkaline digestion and rendering (see Table 8).

When applicable, cattle carcasses will be disposed of on the infected premises to limit the potential spread of disease. However, factors such as the number, size, and species of livestock, the location of the infected premises, the soil types and groundwater locations, and the particular disease agent will determine the most appropriate method of carcass disposal. The State Veterinarian will collaborate with the USDA-APHIS-VS and the CDPHE Solid and Hazardous Waste Program personnel to determine the best location and type of disposal method. Possible methods of carcass disposal are outlined below.

### Table 8. Cattle Disposal Methods: Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposal Method</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Required Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Mass Burial On-Site** | - Removal of large amounts of biomass  
- Facilities can be decontaminated immediately upon removal of livestock  
- Risk of disease spreading is reduced upon burial of livestock. | - May serve as a containment site rather than decomposing livestock  
- Requires multi-agency approval  
- Significant site planning  
- Public opposition  
- Potential environmental contamination  
- Safe management of fluids from decay process | - Excavation equipment  
- Cover material  
- Appropriate landscape                                                                 |
| **Landfill**         | - Cost/ton is manageable in many instances  
- Infrastructure is in place to accept large quantities of materials quickly.  
- Back up safety and compliance teams exist  
- Subtitle D liner systems for containment are in place | - Requires transporting carcasses off-site  
- Permitting process may lead to delay in burial  
- Operator may refuse to accept materials  
- Safe management of fluids from decay process  
- Standard practices are different for each site | - Approved landfill site                                                                                       |
8.3.1 Rendering

Rendering is a process of both physical and chemical transformation resulting in three end products, carcass meal, melted fat, and water. The main carcass rendering processes include size reduction followed by cooking and separation of fat, water, and protein materials. The resulting carcass meal can often be used as an animal feed ingredient. It is unlikely that rendering will be used as a method of disposal during a highly contagious disease outbreak in dairy cattle.

Carcasses may be sent to a licensed rendering plant with the rendering plant operator’s prior approval. Contact the plant to make arrangements before sending carcasses. These facilities may have specific preparation and packaging requirements for the carcasses that must be met before they will accept carcasses for disposal.

8.3.2 Composting

Composting involves a multi-phased decomposition of animal carcasses over a period of time. The process involves the breakdown of organic materials by microorganisms such as bacteria and fungi, which results in the release of heat, water, CO₂ and other gases. The heat is a primary source of energy for the process.

process for virus inactivation. The process can be complex and requires an appropriate site, proper management and a carbon source (such as, wood chips, straw, cornstalks or similar products). Often it is vital to have composting subject matter experts (SMEs) on site when constructing windrows. Guidelines and protocols for disposal and virus inactivation can be found in the FAD PReP SOP: Disposal. Windrow composting is often used for disposal of large animals. There are specific livestock composting contractors within Colorado that may be used as subject matter experts or contracted to do the composting work.

**Off-site:** Carcasses may be sent to an off-site composting facility that is permitted to accept such wastes. Contact the composting facility directly and determine their waste acceptance policies prior to shipping the carcasses.

**On-site:** Composting of carcasses may be allowed on-site. Depending on the specifics of the operation, it may be regulated 1) by the Colorado Department of Agriculture and exempt from Solid Waste regulations; or 2) regulated under dual authority of the CDPHE Solid Waste Program and the local governing authority in accordance with Section 14 of 6 CCR 1007-2. Under option 2, an approved composting plan must be in place before conducting such operations. Composting plan requirements are described in Colorado’s solid waste regulations (6 CCR 1007-2, Part 1, Section 14.11). These plans must include, but are not limited to:

- The basis for selecting the composting site, including site conditions that make it appropriate for a composting operation.
- Structures to be used for run-on and runoff controls.
- Odor management.
- A description of the composting operation, including how the compost will be managed and tested, and what will be done with the final product.

**8.3.3 On-site Burial**

Carcasses may be buried on-site once concurrence has been obtained from CDA, CDPHE, and the appropriate local agencies. CDPHE has put forth the following best management practices:

- Layers of lime or quicklime should be applied below and above the carcasses to help accelerate decomposition of the waste. Care should be used in applying lime as it is caustic and can cause severe burns to the skin and eyes.
- Burial pits must be covered with a minimum of two feet of soil.
- Carcasses cannot be placed in any body of water, seasonal creek or pond, or in other areas that may carry or hold water such as gullies, ditches, blowouts, or natural depressions.
- To minimize potential impacts to groundwater, large numbers of bigger carcasses (e.g., more than ten cows) should not be limed and buried together.
- Surface water must be diverted from the burial site through the use of berms and other structures.
- All carcasses must be buried at least 150 feet away from any water supply source.
- All carcasses must be buried downgradient from any groundwater supply sources.
- The bottom of the burial pit must be at least five feet above the high point of the uppermost groundwater table to ensure that carcasses do not come into contact with groundwater.
- Burial sites must be located at least one mile away from any residence of any person.
- Burial sites should not be located in areas with fractured or cavernous rock, high seasonal water tables or highly permeable soils.

8.3.4 Landfill Burial

The use of permitted landfills for carcass and material disposal may be an option. Some landfills may need a waiver or exemption from the CDPHE to accept livestock carcasses and there may be a limit placed on the landfill concerning the number of carcasses that they may accept for burial. The necessary equipment, personnel, procedures, and containment systems are already in place. Landfill approval will be needed prior to transport of the carcasses to the facility. A downside to landfill burial is that transport of carcasses to the landfill can pose some risk of disease spread.

Carcasses may be sent to a permitted solid waste landfill for disposal with the landfill operator’s prior approval. Contact the landfill operator first to determine their waste acceptance policies. Many landfills have specific days or times when they will accept carcasses for disposal or may have certain packaging requirements that must be met before they will accept the waste.

8.3.5 Incineration

There are three broad categories of incineration: open-air, fixed facility, and air-curtain.

- Open-air includes burning carcasses in an open field.
- Examples of fixed facilities are crematoria, small carcass incinerators at veterinary colleges, large waste incineration plants, on-site incinerators, and power plants.
- Air-curtain incineration involves a machine that fan-forces a mass of air through a manifold that accelerates the incineration process generally conducted in an earthen trench. Air-curtain incineration has been used in Colorado to dispose of animals infected with scrapie, a prion disease that causes chronic wasting.

**Off-site:** Carcasses may be sent to an off-site incinerator (for example, a pet crematory) that is permitted and approved by local authorities and/or CDPHE’s Air Pollution Control Division to accept such wastes. Contact the facility to see if they have any preparation or quantity limitations prior to transporting the carcasses.

**On-site:** In certain cases, carcasses may be incinerated in an onsite pit. Open burning permits, obtained through CDPHE’s Air Pollution Control Division, are required for this process. Pit incineration is generally used when there are several animal mortalities that resulted from disease and there is a risk for disease transmission if the carcasses are transported for disposal offsite. Additional controls, such as plans for disposition of the ash and other remains, must be specified prior to using this process.

8.3.6 Alkaline Hydrolysis
Alkaline hydrolysis is a process that uses a caustic agent, such as sodium hydroxide, and heat to hydrolyze carcasses into a sterile solution and calcium products. The process requires expensive equipment and provides only low volume capacity; therefore, this method has limited application in a disease outbreak situation.

8.4 Milk and Wastewater Disposal

It is recommended for dairy producers to have procedures in place for disposal of small and large amounts of milk and wastewater. Considerations for milk and waste water disposal are: herd size, milking equipment, disinfectants/cleansers used, milk holding tank size, on-farm treatment options, and local, state, and federal environmental statutes.

8.4.1 Milk Disposal Options

In the event that an infected premises is required to dispose of contaminated raw milk, the State Veterinarian will work with the producer to determine the appropriate disposal method. Options for milk disposal are provided below.

Land Application
The rate at which milk is applied to land will be based on soil type, vegetation cover, and soil moisture. Avoid spreading milk near field edges to prevent spill over on to roads and ditches.

Manure Lagoon
Milk disposed in a well operated manure lagoon should be slightly agitated to assist bacterial population to adjust to the different nutrient loading. Disposing of milk in manure lagoons may increase odors if the lagoon is lacking diluted water.

Liquid Manure Storage Structure
Similar to disposing of raw milk in a manure lagoon, it is recommended to slightly agitate milk when disposing of it in a liquid manure storage structure to prevent killing beneficial bacteria.

Municipal Sewage Treatment Plant
In certain areas, disposing of milk at a permitted wastewater treatment plant may be an option for dairy producers. Since milk would be transported off-site, this option may not be an appropriate option for certain diseases.

Burial Pit
Large quantities of contaminated milk can pumped into a shallow fenced-off pit. Milk may need to be decontaminated prior to burial.

8.4.2 Milk Decontamination

Depending on the mode of transmission of the disease agent, the State Veterinarian may require dairy producers to treat infected milk prior to disposal. The following protocols are methods available to producers to decontaminate milk.

- Mixing milk with acid or hypochlorite and allowing it to sit for one hour.
• 2% solution of citric acid: Mix 200 grams of citric acid in 10 liters of milk.
• Acetic acid: Add 200 milliliters acetic acid to 10 liters of milk
• 2-3% calcium hypochlorite (pool chlorine): Add one kilogram of calcium hypochlorite to 30 liters of milk.
• Sodium hydroxide can be used to alkalize milk by slowly adding 600 milliliters of concentrated solution (50 per cent w/w, SG + 1.53) to 100 liters milk until pH above 11 is reached.

Source: Dr. Sandra Amass, Dairy Industry Facilities Manual (Draft 8/03) National Biosecurity Resource Center

8.5 Alternatives to Depopulation: Vaccination

In most disease outbreaks, depopulation will be the primary method utilized to stop transmission and spread of the disease agent within affected animals on diseased premises. However, under certain circumstances, additional methods may need to be implemented. The use of emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in an FMD outbreak. This decision will be made by federal and state animal health officials based on the characteristics of the outbreak and other unique factors related to a particular outbreak. An emergency vaccination strategy can help achieve the goals of an FMD response effort. In order to be effective, vaccines used in an emergency vaccination for FMD must be matched to the specific serotype, and ideally matched with the field strain causing the outbreak.

Vaccination is a tool that can be utilized in conjunction with stamping out to alleviate a disease outbreak. Policy frameworks for the use of vaccines during an outbreak include:

• Stamping out with emergency vaccination to kill
• Stamping out with emergency vaccination to slaughter
• Stamping out with emergency vaccination to live
• Emergency vaccination to live without stamping out

The use of emergency vaccination will be determined by the Unified Command and State Veterinarian in collaboration with the USDA-APHIS-VS Deputy Administrator. Use of vaccines can alter a country’s willingness to receive import of livestock and livestock products from the United States and can affect disease-free status as defined by the OIE. Detailed information about vaccination strategies can be found in the FAD PReP Foot-and-Mouth Disease Red Book.

New technology in vaccine development has resulted in some ‘marker’ vaccines. This type of vaccine allows, via serological testing, animal health officials to distinguish vaccinated animals from naturally infected animals. Such a distinction is critical when providing proof of disease free status to world animal health organizations and individual countries.

8.5.1 Vaccination Strategies

Vaccines can be utilized for different purposes during an animal health emergency. Strategies for vaccine use are described below.
A **suppressive vaccination** strategy is used as a disease control measure to reduce the viral shedding of livestock that have been exposed to the disease agent. This type of strategy is more commonly used in situations of intensive farming, usually due to resource constraints, such as constraints on carcass disposal.

A **preventive vaccination strategy** is used for high-risk animals not included in the control area but in close proximity to the infected premises to be considered at risk for exposure. This strategy is an alternative to the traditional stamping-out policy. Numerous factors should considered prior to implementing this strategy such as: acceptance of vaccine internationally and the effectiveness of the vaccine. A preventive vaccination is also an option for threatened or endangered species that may be considered at risk due to exposure the disease agent.

A **barrier vaccination** policy can be used to implement a preventive vaccination strategy. This policy is based on a spatial pattern developed to create a barrier between the infected premises and at risk premises. The intent of a barrier vaccination is to inhibit the disease transmission rate by vaccinating all suspected livestock. Common types of vaccination barriers are illustrated below. The area of the barrier will be dependent upon the epidemiology of the pathogen, livestock density, and available resources. See *Figure 2. Barrier Vaccination Examples*.

A **targeted vaccination** policy can also be used preemptively. The targeted vaccination is commonly used to vaccinate livestock in facilities with a high animal density. Targeted vaccination may also be used to protect threatened and endangered species see *Figure 3. Targeted and Area Vaccination Diagram*.

**Area or Blanketed Vaccination** also known as a mass vaccination entails vaccinating all livestock within a delineated geographical area. The defined area may be an isolated area, a large region or state. Often area vaccinations are used when traditional stamping out methods are not meeting disease control objectives. See *Figure 3. Targeted and Area Vaccination Diagram*.

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**Figure 2. Barrier Vaccination Examples**

![Firebreak Vaccination](image1)

![Ring Vaccination](image2)

---

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8.6 Cleaning and Disinfection of an Infected Premises

After disposal of infected carcasses is complete and before the facility can be restocked, the infectious organism must be eliminated from the premises. Cleaning and disinfection procedures (also known as virus elimination) require careful planning and coordination to ensure optimum reduction or elimination of the targeted pathogen on the infected premises, to prevent further movement of pathogens between premises, and to ensure the safety of the response personnel, animals, and environment. Selected cleaning and disinfection methods should account for physical characteristics of the premises and other factors, such as environmental conditions, which may influence the effectiveness of virus elimination.

Pathogens vary in their ability to survive or persist in the environment as well as their susceptibility to disinfection. It is important to be aware of the suspect or confirmed pathogen involved in order to select the most efficacious disinfection method. This will include understanding the general properties of the disease agent, its ability to persist in the environment, its transmission, and its susceptibility to disinfection. For chemical disinfection, see the [EPA chart of diseases and approved disinfectants](#).

Pest control must be completed before cleaning and disinfection can commence. Care must be taken to reduce the generation and dispersal of infective dust and aerosols. If items cannot be adequately cleaned and disinfected, they must be disposed of by other appropriate means determined by the Incident Command.

If available personnel or materials are insufficient, Incident Command can request emergency 3D (depopulation, disposal, and decontamination) contractor support from the National Veterinary Stockpile (see section 8.8).

**Table 9. Cleaning and Disinfection Definitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleaning</th>
<th>The removal of gross contamination, organic material, and debris from the premises or respective structures, via mechanical means like sweeping (dry cleaning) and/or</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
the use of water and soap or detergent (wet cleaning). The goal is to minimize organic material so disinfection can be effective.

| **Disinfection** | Methods used on surfaces to destroy or eliminate a specific species of infectious microorganism through physical (e.g., heat) or chemical (e.g., disinfectant) means. A combination of methods may be required. |
| **Virus Elimination** | Cleaning and disinfection measures conducted with the primary purpose to destroy or eliminate all virus on the premises as cost effectively as possible. |

Source: NAHEMS Cleaning and Disinfection Guidelines

Key cleaning and disinfection coordination activities:

- Collaborate with unified Incident Command personnel to develop an effective cleaning and disinfection strategy, including issues such as environmental conditions
- Determine supply requirements and delivery locations, date, and time in collaboration with the Logistics Section
- Arrange facility access and determine personnel requirements with Operations Section
- Prepare for and organize personnel supplies, equipment, and daily accommodations (e.g., food, water, and lodging) with the Logistics Section
- Establish cleaning and disinfection stations that adhere to biosecurity measures, such as vehicle entry and movement control checkpoints with the Animal Biosecurity Group
- Ensure that cleaning and disinfection and disposal processes are properly conducted with the Disposal Group
- Coordinate with the property owner to ensure a smooth process

Cleaning and disinfection activities are coordinated and overseen by the unified Incident Management Team from the Incident Command Post. After a Cleaning and Disinfection Group is established, depending on the incident, the Cleaning and Disinfection Group Supervisor may deploy one or more cleaning and disinfection teams to complete the response activities. These teams may be either Task Force teams or Strike teams depending on the incident requirements.

See the following guidance documents for cleaning and disinfection of premises:

- FAD PReP SOP: Cleaning and Disinfection
- NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection

The following sections outline different methods used for cleaning and disinfection. Traditionally, facilities have been dry cleaned, followed by power washing and application of a chemical disinfectant. More recently, dry cleaning followed by heat disinfection have been used successfully. There are pros and cons to each method and depend on the type of facility being treated.

**Dairy Operation Challenges**: Unique challenges for cleaning and disinfection of dairy operations include milking equipment such as milking units, strainers, coolers, and the bulk tank(s). Milk film or deposits on equipment can impact disinfection efficacy.
Since the daily operation of dairies involves strict sanitation and disinfection protocols for milking equipment, input and assistance from the dairy manager or personnel may be useful to determine effective disinfection methods that will not cause damage to milking machines and tanks. Labels of products used on milking equipment must specifically list this equipment since they are considered food-contact surfaces and a tolerance or exemption from tolerance is required for such products.

*heat disinfection for cattle trailers

8.6.1 Dry Cleaning

Whether the second step is wet cleaning or heat application, both require a thorough dry cleaning of the facility first. Dry cleaning involves the removal of any gross contamination and organic material (e.g., soil, manure, bedding, feed) from production areas or equipment.

Shovels, manure forks, brooms, and brushed should be used to sweep, scrape, and remove organic material and debris from surfaces. In situations involving highly contagious FADs, moistening the area or item with water may be helpful for controlling dust and minimizing aerosolization of pathogens. Bins may air in transport of the material to the disposal area. Heavy equipment such as bobcats or tractors may be needed to remove large quantities of manure and bedding. Air blowers should not be used for dry cleaning due to the risk of spreading pathogens.

Disposal of all materials should be in a manner that minimizes further spread of pathogens and that is compliant with federal, state, and local regulations and policies. This may involve the burning, burial, or composting of material. Items that are difficult to clean or are of limited financial value (e.g., wooden gates or bunks, ropes, halters, pallets) should be appraised and disposed.

This process may require considerable time and effort, depending on the size and type of facility, but it is essential as this material can harbor pathogens and reduce the efficacy or inactivate some disinfectants. Surfaces may not necessarily be visibly clean when this step is complete due to organic matter that adheres to the surface.

8.6.2 Wet Cleaning and Chemical Disinfection

Chemical disinfection has long shown to be an effective method of decontamination. Chemical disinfectants cannot penetrate debris or organic material, so a facility must be thoroughly cleaned and all organic debris prior to application. Environmental conditions such as organic load, surface topography, temperature, pH, water hardness, relative humidity, and the presence of other chemicals can impact the efficacy of disinfection procedures.

There are downsides to chemical disinfection, mostly related to the cleaning processes. Preparation of facilities for chemical disinfection can be very challenging and time consuming. Removal of organic debris must be done by hand, and some areas can be difficult to access. Wet cleaning can damage electrical systems. There are as challenges with preparation for chemical disinfection as the wet cleaning/power washing step can damage clay floors and leave standing water inside.
Wet Cleaning:

Following the removal of gross contamination (dry cleaning), areas or items should be washed with detergent. The washing helps to further reduce the number of pathogens as well as removing any oil, grease, or exudates that may inhibit the action of disinfection. Washing prior to disinfection is one of the most commonly overlooked steps in the cleaning and disinfection process.

Prior to washing, all electrical equipment should be turned off and removed, or covered tightly with plastic sheeting. An electrician may need to be contacted for the removal of thermostats, timing devices, motor controls, and remote sensing equipment prior to washing. An alternative power supply (e.g., adjacent building, portable generator) may be needed to power electrical washing equipment.

Areas and items with organic material adhered to the surfaces should be pre-soaked for several hours. Soaps or detergents can help disperse and remove organic material; however, the cleaning product used must be compatible with the disinfectant selected. Some disinfectant products may be formulated with a detergent component. Washing with a cleaner or detergent is required for disinfectants that do not contain these components.

Mechanical scrubbing and scraping (e.g., brushes) may be necessary to remove oils, grease, or exudates. Rough surfaces should be scrubbed with a wire brush to ensure that they are as clean as possible. Deep cracks, crevices, or other surface irregularities should be given special attention to dislodge accumulated grime.

High pressure water and detergent is very effective in removing the heavy accumulation of urine and feces often present in the environment and for cleaning porous surfaces. However, in cases of highly infectious or zoonotic pathogens, high pressure systems should be avoided or used with caution to avoid further dispersal of the pathogen or risk to the applicator.

Rinse and Dry:

After washing, all surfaces should be thoroughly rinsed, as residues from cleaners and detergent can inactivate certain chemical disinfectants. Rinsing should be done with cold water at a low pressure. Whenever possible, surfaces should be allowed to dry completely (if possible overnight) before application of a disinfectant. Excess moisture may dilute and reduce the efficacy of the disinfectant applied to the surface. In cool or cold weather, drying can be accomplished by heating the building and circulating the air with auxiliary blowers.

Disinfection:

Once surfaces are completely cleaned, rinsed, and dried, application of an appropriate disinfectant can proceed. Application methods may involve spraying, fogging or misting, immersing or wiping or mopping methods. Because products differ in formulation, the directions for use also differ. The specific manufacturer’s instructions for effective use of a disinfectant should be followed. Appropriate safety measures should be taken when implementing the disinfection process.
The USDA does not recommend any specific disinfectant, but does require that the one selected be EPA approved: **EPA chart of diseases and approved disinfectants**.

Regardless of the disinfectant chosen, one of the most important components of the procedure is to allow adequate contact time for the process to have its impact. In some cases, the chemical disinfectant may need to be reapplied to keep the surface wet for the required contact time.

Following the application and subsequent contact time of chemical disinfectants, items and areas should be thoroughly rinsed. Most chemical disinfectants can be harmful to animals and should be rinsed with potable water and surfaces should be allowed to air dry prior to restocking of the area.

### 8.6.3 Heat Disinfection

An alternative to chemical disinfection is heat. Heat disinfection was recently demonstrated as a cost-effective option as an accepted method of disinfection/virus elimination (in recent HPAI outbreaks in the United States). Heat treatment may not be appropriate in all situations (e.g., older, drafty barns or in the middle of winter in cold areas of the state). The challenge with heat disinfection is primarily maintenance of appropriate temperatures within the facility during treatment.

Preparation for heat disinfection is limited to the dry cleaning step. Heat penetrates surfaces and residual organic debris, and eliminates the need for wet cleaning/power washing. Wet cleaning is not recommended in preparation for heat disinfection due to likelihood of standing water and water pooling.

Current policy guidance (only developed for HPAI) states that barns/houses must be heated to between 100°F and 120°F for a total of 7 days; with at least 3 consecutive days (of the 7 days) of heating continuously to within this temperature range. To avoid damage to structures and fixtures, temperatures should not exceed 120°F.

**Transport Vehicle Heat Disinfection:**

Although heat disinfection has not been routinely used in cattle operations, it should be considered as an option for transport vehicles in an emergency disease outbreak if appropriate facilities are available.

Heat disinfection (also known as thermos-assisted drying and decontamination) has successfully been used in livestock operations to decontaminate transport vehicles. For example, **PEDV** has been inactivated by heating trailers to 160°F for 10 minutes and **PRRSv** has been inactivated by heating trailers to 160°F for 20+ minutes.

**General information on heat treatment:**

Heat can be applied under moist (e.g., autoclave, steam) or dry (e.g., flame, baking) conditions. Moist heat can be effectively applied through steam, boiling, or pasteurization. Steam under pressure (e.g., autoclaving) is the most efficient since it can achieve temperatures above the boiling point of water, which may be necessary when dealing with thermally resistant bacterial spores.
Dry heat applications involve incineration (i.e., flaming) or hot air (i.e., baking). It can be useful for disinfection of heat-resistant materials, such as glass or metals.

Most vegetative bacteria inactivated at moist-heat temperatures of 131-149°F. Rapid destruction can occur at higher temperatures (e.g., less than 20 seconds at 161°F or within seconds at temperatures above 176°F). Many viruses are labile at temperatures close to 158°F. Bacterial endospores require temperatures of 250°F or more for at least 15 minutes for destruction. Prions, such as those that cause BSE, exhibit exceptional thermal stability.

### 8.7 Evaluation of Cleaning and Disinfection of an Infected Premises

Evaluation of a site following cleaning and disinfection should ensure all tasks detailed on the premises assessment have been performed. Factors to be addressed should include the following:

- All grossly contaminated areas have been identified and properly cleaned and disinfected.
- All personnel are aware of and are implementing cleaning and disinfection measures for themselves and their equipment (e.g., PPE, tools, instruments).
- Gross debris (e.g., manure, unused feed, or bedding) has been removed and properly disposed of.
- Any contaminated wood or items difficult to disinfect have been appraised, removed, and disposed of in a manner that minimized the spread of pathogens (e.g., burned, composed, buried).
- All fixtures and fittings have been dismantled, cleaned, and disinfected.
- All infected or suspected areas have been properly washed, rinsed, and disinfected. Visual inspection should be conducted to ensure surfaces are clean and no organic material has been left behind.
- An EPA-registered or exempted disinfectant that is efficacious against the target microorganism was used at the appropriate concentration.
- The necessary contact time for the disinfectant was allowed.
- Effluent from the C&D procedures has been handled in a manner to minimize or avoid environmental impact.

Final inspection of the premises should be conducted by experienced personnel. If there is any doubt or sign of inadequate procedures, the disinfection measures must be repeated. Once final inspection of the premises has occurred, any and all personnel should proceed through the cleaning and disinfection site before leaving the premises.

### 8.8 National Veterinary Stockpile

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) is the Nation’s repository of vaccines and other critical veterinary supplies and equipment. The NVS is designed to augment state and local resources in the fight against dangerous animal diseases that could potentially devastate American agriculture, seriously affect the economy, and threaten the public’s health. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) established the NVS in 2004. The Directive requires APHIS to be able to deploy the NVS to the site of a dangerous animal disease outbreak within 24 hours. To accomplish this critical mandate, the NVS defined agents of greatest interest to animal health and has prioritized its resources accordingly. The NVS currently holds or has systems in place to provide:

- Personal protective equipment (PPE) for 310 responders for 10 days in a high-risk environment
- Further PPE to protect 3,000 responders for 40 days
- Contracts with vendors to provide depopulation and carcass disposal services.
- Satellite data and voice equipment that is portable and capable of establishing temporary command posts
- Decontamination supplies
- Vaccines and other supplies.

More information on the National Veterinary Stockpile can be found in the Colorado National Veterinary Stockpile and Agricultural Logistics Plan (2012).

9.0 Business Continuity: Protect Economic Viability and Continuity of Operations

Maintaining business continuity and the movement of dairy cattle and dairy products that are unaffected by a disease outbreak is a critical component of the CDA Dairy Cattle Emergency Disease Response Plan. The movement of dairy cattle and dairy products will be at the discretion of the State Veterinarian in collaboration with the USDA-APHIS-VS officials and will be based on the epidemiology of the disease agent and extent of the outbreak.

Guidance on the managed movement of cattle and cattle products during a disease outbreak is found in the Secure Beef Supply Plan, and covers biosecurity and testing requirements prior to movement. The goals of the Secure Beef Supply Plan are to maintain business continuity for beef producers and processors during an FMD outbreak; minimize disease spread; and assure a continuous supply of beef products to consumers.

Guidance on the managed movement of raw milk during a disease outbreak is found in the Secure Milk Supply Plan. The Colorado Secure Milk Supply Plan provides additional guidance, beyond that described in the National Secure Milk Supply Plan, for the Colorado Dairy industry to move raw milk to processing from unaffected dairy farms in a Control Area.

The following are additional resources that provide guidance on movement control and permitting:

- Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book
- USDA FAD PReP Manual 6-0: Permitted Movement
- NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control
- Secure Beef Supply Plan
9.1 Controlled Animal Movement

Initially, during a disease outbreak, the State Veterinarian may issue livestock movement controls for all cattle or for those species involved in transmission of the disease, as well as finding an acceptable destination for any truckloads of livestock in transit. Once the outbreak has been characterized, a system will be set up to restart movement of cattle, feed, and other livestock under permit from the State Veterinarian’s Office and appropriate biosecurity. The managed movement of cattle during an FMD outbreak will be divided into two chronological periods separated by a period of non-movement to establish appropriate movement permitting systems. See Figure 4. Timeline of Early Events in a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak.

By restricting the movement of animals, animal products, and contaminated fomites, quarantine and movement control can be a powerful tool in controlling and containing an FAD outbreak. Movement control is accomplished through a permit system that allows entities to make necessary movements without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread. Operational staff members need to strictly adhere to movement control procedures, which are based on the best scientific information available at the time.

During a disease outbreak, producers should be prepared to manage their feedlot without being allowed to move animals for several days to weeks if they are located in a regulatory Control Area. This will give time to conduct surveillance to demonstrate a lack of evidence of disease and move confidence that a movement does not present a significant risk for disease spread.

Figure 4. Timeline of Early Events in a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak

Source: Secure Beef Supply Plan: Managed Movement (April 2016)

Once the extent of the outbreak can be reasonably estimated, appropriate movement permitting systems will be established. In order for a permit to be issued, minimal criteria must be met. These
are subject to change, depending on the disease, extent of the outbreak, and the best science- and risk-based information available. See Tables 11, 12, and 13 in Section 9.4.

9.2 Bio-secure Transportation Corridors

As mentioned, allowing unaffected animals and animal food products to move during an animal disease outbreak is essential to maintaining industry business continuity. Thus, movement of cattle and other livestock that are deemed disease-free will take place along bio-secure corridors.

Bio-secure corridors are transportation routes located outside of the quarantine area that will allow livestock and animal food products to travel safely without risk of exposure to an animal disease. Identifying bio-secure corridors will be the responsibility of the CDA with assistance from the Colorado State Patrol, CDOT, and local law enforcement agencies. Livestock associations and the trucking industry will be essential in the effective implementation of livestock movement corridors.

9.3 Secure Beef Supply: Movement Definitions

The Secure Beef Supply Plan has movements classified as those Outside or Inside a Control Area.

- **Outside a Control Area**: If a production site is outside a Control Area, cattle movements from that site will either be to another premises outside a Control Area(s) or to a premises inside a Control Area.

- **Inside a Control Area**: If a production site is inside a Control Area, cattle movements from that site will either be to another premises inside of a Control Area or to a premises outside a Control Area.

9.3.1 Movement from Outside a Control Area

- Movement from outside to outside:
  
  Cattle with no evidence of infection should be allowed to move to other premises outside of Control Areas if the movements can be completed without passing through a Control Area.

- Movement from outside to inside:
  
  Cattle movements to a premises inside a Control Area should be limited to finished cattle moving directly to slaughter, although during a lengthy outbreak limited shipments of other cattle may need to move into a Control Area to maintain continuity of business. All cattle movements from outside a Control Area to inside a Control Area should be accompanied by a permit. Vaccination may be required before cattle are permitted to move.

- Traffic:
  
  Production sites outside of a Control Area will have traffic entering their premises to deliver commodities and goods, pick up finished cattle for slaughter, remove animals to be rendered and other waste products, and provide nutrition and veterinary services, as well
as other purposes. Production sites should verify vehicles have not come from inside or passed through a Control Area without undergoing appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures before allowing entry across the Line of Separation (see SBS Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity) onto the site. Enhanced biosecurity for all traffic entering a production site is encouraged for all.

9.3.2 Movement from Inside a Control Area

- Demonstrate lack of evidence of infection and meet Biosecurity Performance Standards:
  Any premises within a Control Area that wishes to move cattle should provide documentation demonstrating a lack of evidence of infection (as described in SBS Surveillance) and meet Biosecurity Performance Standards in order to request a movement permit.

- Valid Movement Permit required:
  Any cattle movement from inside a Control Area should be accompanied by a valid movement permit.

- Move directly to slaughter:
  Finished cattle that demonstrate a lack of evidence of infection and are accompanied by a valid movement permit may be allowed to move directly to slaughter. If the cattle need to travel to a packing plant outside the Control area, the driver should follow a pre-determined route to minimize the risk of exposing susceptible animals to the virus.

- Traffic:
  Traffic will need to move into production sites that are inside of Control Area. The size of the outbreak and choice of response strategy will determine what kind of movements will need to enter the Control Area. Traffic that crosses onto a livestock premises within a Control Area should be accompanied by a valid movement permit and undergo appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures.

9.3.3 Transporters

- Outside a Control Area:
  Transporters operating outside of a Control Area should be mindful of where Control Areas exist and alter routes to avoid entering or passing through Control Areas. Transporters may need to modify their routines to accommodate increased biosecurity requirements implemented by livestock premises working to protect their herds.

- Inside a Control Area:
  Any traffic entering a premises with susceptible animals within a Control Area should be accompanied by a valid movement permit.

  Any traffic that has entered a Control Area should be assumed to have come in contact
with contaminated roadways. At a minimum, the tires, wheels, and undercarriage of the vehicle should undergo cleaning and disinfection procedures before crossing a Line of Separation (LOS) to enter any premises with susceptible species.

9.3.4 Processors

- Outside a Control Area:

  If a packing plant outside of a Control Area has received or is receiving cattle from inside one or more Control Areas, the receiving plant and any roadways that the shipments from the Control Area have traveled on should be considered to be potentially contaminated. Traffic that has entered the premises of one of these packing plants should undergo cleaning and disinfection procedures as required by Incident Command, especially before traversing a LOS at an uninfected premises.

  If a packing plant outside of a Control Area has not received or is not receiving shipments of cattle from inside any Control Area, traffic should continue normally while keeping in mind that the status of any premises, the status of shipments, and areas designated as Control Areas may change rapidly. Therefore, the packing plants should be prepared to implement cleaning and disinfection procedures as required by Incident Command in a prompt manner. These packing plants should work with transport companies to assure shipments are not traveling through Control Areas en route to the plant.

- Inside a Control Area:

  If a packing plant is located inside a Control Area, cattle movements should continue to the plant in order for the plant to maintain continuity of business and to get apparently healthy cattle processed as quickly as possible. This will decrease the number of naïve susceptible animals at risk of contracting FMD. If possible, packing plants within the Control Area should harvest cattle from within the Control Area.

  Cattle movement to the plant should be accompanied by a valid movement permit.

  Ideally, all trucks delivering cattle should undergo cleaning and disinfection procedures as required by Incident Command regardless of the origin of the cattle shipment. Availability of resources and weather conditions will greatly impact the logistics of implementing cleaning and disinfection procedures.

  Ideally, all trucks transporting meat products from the plants should undergo cleaning and disinfection procedures for the tires, wheels, and undercarriage upon leaving the plant and/or Control Area if they share traffic routes with trucks delivering live animals.

  Packing plants should explore options for transporting employees to and from the plant in a manner that minimizes potential cross-contamination of personal vehicles and carrying virus on employees’ apparel and footwear.

9.4 Movement Tables
The following tables are from the FMD Red Book and provide useful guidance on movement of products during an FMD outbreak.

- **Table 10. Movement into a Control Area from outside a Control Area**
- **Table 11. Movement within a Control Area**
- **Table 12. Movement from inside a Control Area to outside a Control Area**
Table 10. Movement into a Control Area from outside a Control Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item moving into a Control Area to a/an...</th>
<th>Infected Premises</th>
<th>Suspect Premises^</th>
<th>Contact Premises^</th>
<th>At-Risk Premises</th>
<th>Monitored Premises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible animals</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC, such as slaughter.</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC, such as slaughter.</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC, such as slaughter.</td>
<td>Permit for movement must be approved by the IC with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Permit for movement must be approved by the IC with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible animal products</td>
<td>See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. Please see Section 5.10.5 which contains OIE FMD-specific guidance for inactivating FMD.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (non-susceptible) from premises with susceptible species</td>
<td>Prohibited unless permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. IC may require a permit for movement depending upon FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. IC may require a permit for movement depending upon FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (non-susceptible) from premises without susceptible species</td>
<td>IC will determine movement restrictions based on FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
<td>IC will determine movement restrictions based on FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
<td>IC will determine movement restrictions based on FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. IC may require a permit for movement depending upon FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures. IC may require a permit for movement depending upon FMD epidemiology and characteristics of destination premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, vehicles, and other fomites from premises with susceptible species</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed with appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

Source: Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book
Table 11. Movement within a Control Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item moving within a Control Area to a/an.</th>
<th>Infected Premises</th>
<th>Suspect Premises^</th>
<th>Contact Premises^</th>
<th>At-Risk Premises</th>
<th>Monitored Premises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible animals</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC, such as slaughter.</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC, such as slaughter.</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC, such as slaughter.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by the IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by the IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible animal products</td>
<td>See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. Please see Section 5.10.5 which contains OIE FMD-specific guidance for inactivating FMD.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (non-susceptible) from premises with susceptible species</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit granted by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit granted by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit granted by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by the IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by the IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (non-susceptible) from premises without susceptible species</td>
<td>n/a (Infected Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (Suspect Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (Contact Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (At-Risk Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (Monitored Premises have susceptible species)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, vehicles, and other fomites from premises with susceptible species</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit granted by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit granted by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit granted by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semen, embryos from susceptible animals</td>
<td>Prohibited.</td>
<td>Prohibited.</td>
<td>Prohibited.</td>
<td>Allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

^ Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

Source: Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book
Table 12. Movement from inside a Control Area to outside a Control Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item moving out of a Control Area from a/an…</th>
<th>Infected Premises</th>
<th>Suspect Premises(^)</th>
<th>Contact Premises(^)</th>
<th>At-Risk Premises</th>
<th>Monitored Premises(^*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible animals</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC.</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC.</td>
<td>Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC.</td>
<td>At-Risk Premises must become Monitored Premises to move susceptible livestock out of a Control Area.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susceptible animal products</td>
<td>See continuity of business plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. Please see Section 5.10.5 which contains OIE FMD-specific guidance for inactivating FMD.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (non-susceptible) from premises <strong>with</strong> susceptible species</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless specific permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
<td>Allowed to move by permit approved by IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (non-susceptible) from premises <strong>without</strong> susceptible species</td>
<td>n/a (Infected Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (Suspect Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (Contact Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (At-Risk Premises have susceptible species)</td>
<td>n/a (Monitored Premises have susceptible species)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, vehicles, and other fomites from premises <strong>with</strong> susceptible species</td>
<td>Prohibited unless permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Prohibited unless permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
<td>Allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semen, embryos from susceptible animals</td>
<td>Prohibited.</td>
<td>Prohibited.</td>
<td>Prohibited.</td>
<td>At-Risk Premises must become Monitored Premises to move semen, embryos from susceptible livestock out of a Control Area.</td>
<td>Monitored Premises only allowed by permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Movement control and permit processes will change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

\(^*\) Contact Premises and Suspect Premises are intended to be short-term premises designations. Ideally these Premises should be re-designated before movements occur.

\(^*\) Continuity of business plans may apply.

Source: Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book
10.0 Recovery: Returning Affected Premises to Normal Business Operations

The actions taken during the recovery period are focused on restoring the situation to normal or near normal as quickly as possible. Issues to consider are repopulation of production facilities, financial considerations, re-establishing public trust and consumer confidence, and review of risk reduction measures. It is important to note that the recovery phase of an incident may last an extended length of time.

10.1 Release of Control Area Restrictions

Quarantine and movement controls will be maintained until at least two incubation periods have elapsed since the decontamination of all confirmed infected premises and negative results of surveillance activities. The State Veterinarian and Incident Command need to plan for the release of quarantine prior to or during the issuance of quarantines and movement controls. Such a plan would specify procedures by which quarantined premises will be evaluated for disease freedom and how the quarantine will be released (by sections, by risk, or in its entirety).

10.2 Repopulation

Restocking guidance: Following appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures, infected premises will remain vacant for a period of time (fallow period) before restocking susceptible animals onto premises. The fallow period should be a minimum of two disease incubation periods. If it is not possible to carry out full cleaning and disinfection procedures, the premises must remain vacant for a longer period of time to be determined by the Incident Commander. It is critically important that in restocking, the IC consider the likelihood of disease survival based on environmental conditions, the execution of cleaning and disinfection procedures, and specific circumstances of the outbreak.

The producer should, in collaboration with Incident Command, come up with a restocking plan, including details of the susceptible species, number of animals, and locations of sentinel animals (if used). Once introduced to the previously infected premises, no animals may leave until all locations on that premises have been restocked and serological diagnostics are negative.

Testing Requirements for Restocking: These guidelines will vary depending on the disease agent. Animals may subject to clinical inspection and diagnostic sample collection and submission. The herd will be tested for the disease agent at intervals determined by the State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS officials. The producers will be required to report increased mortality or suspect clinical signs immediately.

For example, with FMD virus, during restocking animals will be subject to clinical inspection every 3 days for the first 14 days (one OIE incubation period), and once per week thereafter up to 28 days (two OIE incubation periods). At 28 days after the last animals are introduced, each animal must be clinically examined by a veterinary inspector and samples tested for the presence of FMD antibodies.

Approved Sources of Livestock: Introduced livestock must come from areas not subject to quarantine and movement control measures. Depending on the disease agent, animals may be
required to test negative prior to introduction.

For example, with FMD virus, all livestock must test negative before introduction. A 24-hour pre-movement clinical inspection is also required. Animals must originate on and come from premises on which there has not been a confirmed case of FMD within 6.2 miles (10 kilometers) for at least 30 days.

**Sentinel Restocking:** The alternative to fully restocking is to use a small number of sentinel cattle. Serologically negative sentinel cattle are introduced to a facility to determine if pathogens are still present and viable. Sentinel cattle may be retained for at least two specific pathogen incubation periods (to be determined by the State Veterinarian). They will be monitored for clinical signs of the disease and biological samples tested. In the event that sentinel cattle become infected or test positive for the disease, the sentinels will be depopulated and the cleaning and disinfection process will be repeated. The same holds true for facilities that restock with normal herd numbers.

After the sentinel restocking, monitoring, and testing process is complete and the premises is determined to be free of disease, it is released and livestock may be purchased to repopulate the farm.

**Written Consent:** Producers must have written consent from the State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS official to begin the restocking process. If producers choose to restock without explicit permission from the State Veterinarian or USDA-APHIS-VS officials, or do not follow the restocking surveillance and testing requirements, and subsequently become re-infected, they may not be eligible to receive indemnity.

### 10.3 Recovery of Free Status

There are separate requirements (e.g., time and surveillance) for the recovery of free status in previously disease free countries. These requirements are based on the disease agent and can be found in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2016).

### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities

Response to an outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease outbreak will require the coordination of multiple agencies, industry representatives, and stakeholders. A list of local, state, and federal agencies and their possible role in an outbreak response are listed in section 11.2.

#### 11.1 Industry’s Role in a Disease Outbreak

Industry will play an important role both in preventing a disease outbreak and in response to such an event. Communication between government agencies and industry will be essential to effective disease response activities and for timely return to normal dairy production. It is vital for each dairy operation to have the following in place prior to an outbreak.

- A biosecurity plan with written SOPs and appropriate training for employees
- A depopulation plan with written SOPs and a list of equipment needed, a plan or contracts in place to obtain supplies and resources if equipment isn’t already in hand.
11.2 Local, State, and Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities

Responding to a highly contagious animal disease outbreak will require the coordination of multiple agencies. A list of local, state, and federal agencies and their possible role in an outbreak response are listed below.

11.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities of the LEAD AGENCY – Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA)

The CDA, Animal Health Division is the lead agency in any livestock health related emergency occurring in Colorado. CDA will respond by using the NIMS protocol. The specific components will be under the joint command of the State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS officials. Their overall responsibility will encompass command and management of the disease event, overseeing the management and dissemination of resources, establishing a communication and information management system, and securing supporting technologies. The State Veterinarian may use any or all of the following action steps to control and/or eradicate the disease encountered in the event.

- Assign an emergency response level to the incident.
- In consultation with USDA-APHIS-VS officials, determine the scope and level of initial response and initiate a task force.
- In consultation with USDA-APHIS-VS, determine the location and size of hold/quarantine areas.
- Establish quarantine area(s) and issue quarantine orders as needed.
- In consultation with USDA-APHIS-VS officials and other agency personnel, strategically assign duties and areas of responsibility to state, deputy-state and federal veterinarians, members of the Colorado veterinary response team, livestock inspectors and animal health technicians.
- Determine appropriate movement restrictions for animals, people, equipment, feed, commodities and conveyances.
- Prepare information for dissemination to the public, producers, processors and other concerned groups through the Joint Information System or Center. Development of this information will be a collaboration between the CDA, USDA-APHIS-VS, and/or the Incident Management Team and the Public Information Officer.
- CDA will notify Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) when a poultry disease sample is being sent to the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab (NVSL or FADDL - Plum Island, NY) for analysis and is likely to be a highly contagious or infectious disease or agent of concern.
- CDA will coordinate with HSEM, USDA, Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), Colorado State Patrol (CSP) local jurisdictions, and other agencies as needed to enforce stop movement orders.
11.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities of SUPPORT AGENCIES – Local government

Since all emergency response begins at the local level, local emergency management officials will be actively involved in the response and will be a key provider of resources for operational missions. Each county has a comprehensive emergency management plan which provides the framework for the jurisdiction’s response to emergencies and disasters. Counties, through their
assets of County Commissioners, County Extension Offices and their networks, will utilize their resources and provide an additional line of communication with local farmers, industry groups and the community. Additionally, as part of a coordinated response, local law enforcement officers with assistance from Brand Inspectors and Bureau of Animal Protection Agents (BAP) may:

- Assist in identifying clean transportation corridors for moving unaffected livestock and animal food products safely during an animal health incident.
- Provide security in implementing a hold or quarantine for the infected area.
- Assist in the conduct of a criminal investigation.
- Provide site security and conflict resolution as needed to ensure the safety of veterinarians, inspectors, all other responders and the general public should any conflicts arise.

11.2.3 Roles and Responsibilities of SUPPORT AGENCIES - State Agencies

State agencies have diverse roles within the state government and may contribute essential aspects of an emergency response to large-scale animal disease outbreaks. Depending on location and scale, certain smaller outbreaks may not require all of these agencies to be involved.

11.2.3.1 Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM)

Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency has many resources to address emergencies and experiences with all hazard responses. Their support and involvement would be to:

- Activate the State Emergency Management Plan and state EOC to support CDA.
- Support the CDA by providing statewide coordination for logistical support, security, biosecurity, support personnel, procurement of supplies, equipment, vehicles, food, lodging and administrative support during livestock disease emergency response and recovery. Coordinate with CDA for the provision of biosecurity training to support agencies and provide biosecurity training to agency personnel designated for operations in the affected area.
- Deployment of State Incident Management Teams (IMTs) to manage incidents such as the Eastern Colorado IMT with whom CDA has entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU).

11.2.3.2 Colorado State Patrol (CSP)

Colorado State Patrol’s (CSP) support and involvement would be to:

- Quickly respond to, diligently investigate, coordinate with, and take direction from the CDA to prevent the introduction of or spread of a FAD, such as FMD.
- Be the primary agency for controlling vehicles carrying agricultural products. The State Patrol will work closely with the CDA, the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM), Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), local law enforcement and other support agencies in the operation of road closures and the diversion of vehicles carrying agricultural products.
• Provide law enforcement support and coordination with conducting traffic checkpoints and roadblocks, enforcing controlled movement orders (CMOs) for animals and animal products (e.g., cattle and milk), and securing quarantined areas and related sites during animal disease emergencies.

11.2.3.3  Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

The CDPHE will likely be involved in the response if a zoonotic potential condition exists. Their roles and responsibilities would be to:

• Coordinate with CDA if a zoonotic condition exists.
• Support public information efforts.
• Consult with CDA and USDA-APHIS-VS regarding bio-security issues related to zoonotic diseases.
• Provide veterinary and epizootiologic support.
• Assist and collaborate with CDA on subjects such as carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, and other issues that may affect humans through potential contamination of soil, water and air quality.
• Liaison with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address issues that may arise.
• Provide laboratory emergency response and/or surge support.
• Colorado Human Services Department may provide or coordinate mental health staff to assist in crisis counseling efforts.

11.2.3.4  Colorado Parks and Wildlife

Parks and Wildlife will work with CDA to provide the following services:

• Provide disease surveillance in free-ranging wildlife and wildlife in zoos, parks, and other natural areas.
• Survey for and/or dispose of contaminated items and wild animals.
• Conduct wild animal inventories in the area of a disease event to identify susceptible species.
• In collaboration with the State Veterinarian, collect wildlife specimens and samples for disease testing to determine presence or absence of disease or transmission of the disease agent or impact of disease on wildlife.
• Provide field personnel to assist in cattle disease response, control, and recovery efforts.
• Depending on the disease outbreak and the transmission characteristics, it may affect hunting. CPW would inform hunters on the changes and provide education to hunters. Wildlife and livestock are often susceptible to the same pathogens, so close collaboration between CDA and CPW would be important. Hunters depend on landowners and livestock producers for full enjoyment of their sport.
• In the event that wildlife are involved in the FAD outbreak in domestic livestock, hunting and other activities, such as a field trials, should be identified to determine the risk. Wildlife
personnel and any wildlife or wildlife product physically transported by personnel must adhere to the quarantine and movement control guidance provided by Incident Command.

11.2.3.5 **Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT)**

CDOT’s roles and responsibilities during a disease outbreak would be to:

- Assist in the movement of state resources during livestock disease emergencies.
- Provide traffic control and routing assistance, barricades, and road monitoring.
- Provide equipment and operators to assist with animal disposal.

11.2.3.6 **Colorado State University (CSU)**

Colorado State University’s College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences (CVMBS) is involved in programs related to livestock diseases, from providing surveillance testing at dairies to providing educational materials to the community. During a major livestock disease outbreak, their responsibilities would be to:

- Provide veterinary support and expertise throughout the emergency as requested by CDA.
- Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory may provide appropriate diagnostic support services as requested by CDA.
- Colorado State University Extension may provide, communication, and liaison between Incident Command, affected industry groups and local communities during emergencies.

11.2.4 **Roles and Responsibilities of SUPPORT AGENCIES – United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)**

There are multiple federal agencies that have the potential to be involved during a disease outbreak depending on areas affected and size and scope of the outbreak. There is great need for cooperation and interagency support to accomplish all of the processes involved with mitigating and eradicating a significant infectious disease. These federal agencies will work collaboratively with each other, CDA and the state and local agencies discussed above.

11.2.4.1 **Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)**

USDA-APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) is the primary federal agency in charge of significant animal disease outbreaks of concern. Across the nation, APHIS-VS collaborates daily with each State Veterinarian’s office to monitor for foreign animal diseases (FADs), emerging infectious diseases and to administer programs to eradicate diseases such as tuberculosis and brucellosis.

APHIS-VS maintains a group of national IMTs, each one composed of 20 – 30 VS employees, ready to deploy and assist with containing and eradicating disease outbreaks of concern. During an outbreak, Colorado’s State Veterinarian may request the assistance of APHIS-VS’s national IMT to deploy and help with all aspects of the response:
• Assist in everything from quarantine, evaluation and indemnification of livestock, slaughter, disposal, cleaning and disinfecting, epidemiology and trace-backs, to facilitating permitting for dairy cattle and dairy product movement.
• Assist in acquiring appropriate contractors to conduct various response activities such as those listed above.
• Consult with state and local authorities regarding eradication proceedings.
• Collect, analyze, and disseminate technical and logistical information.
• Define training requirements for temporary employees or support agencies involved in eradication operations.
• Issue a declaration of extraordinary emergency.
• Coordinate with state and local agencies to define quarantine and buffer zones.
• Prepare information for dissemination to the public, producers, processors and other concerned groups through the Joint Information Center (JIC).
• Allocate funding for indemnifying to the owner(s) of depopulated animals or related property loss.
• Allocate funding for activities related to depopulation, disposal and virus elimination.
• Define restrictions on interstate commerce.

11.2.4.2 APHIS Wildlife Services (APHIS-WS)
Wildlife Services (WS) is a division of APHIS and its mission is to resolve wildlife conflicts to allow people and wildlife to co-exist. During a disease outbreak in cattle, WS will assist in surveillance of wildlife populations for the disease of concern. As part of APHIS, WS employees may also be deployed to work within the incident as members of the IMT.

11.2.4.3 USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)
FSIS is charged with protecting the Nation's food supply by providing inspectors and veterinarians in meat and dairy product plants to prevent, detect, and act in response to food safety emergencies. FSIS has developed the infrastructure needed to confront new biosecurity challenges. FSIS may assist state and local authorities in disease eradication activities and/or food-borne illness emergency investigations.

11.2.4.4 USDA Customs and Border Protection
Shall inspect and regulate movement of at risk people, agricultural products or product containers or the likely at ports-of entry (such as Denver International Airport) to prevent, detect or act in response to agricultural emergencies.

11.2.5 Roles and Responsibilities of SUPPORT AGENCIES – other federal agencies
Under Emergency Support Function (ESF-11) federal regulations, the USDA is responsible for response to animal disease emergencies. However, other federal agencies outside of the USDA may also have jurisdiction in a disease outbreak response.

11.2.5.1 Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

One of FDA’s mandates is to protect the public health by assuring the safety of our nation's food supply. FDA also has an important role in prevention and control of contaminated animal feed. FDA may assist state and local authorities in disease eradication activities and/or food-borne illness emergency investigations.

11.2.5.2 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI is the agency responsible for investigating cases of bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism as part of the mission of a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). When food animals are the target of a terrorists attack and evidence suggests a foreign animal disease may have been intentionally introduced or threatened, CDA will notify the CIAC who in turn will coordinate activities with the JIFF within the Denver Office of the FBI.

11.2.5.3 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

The federal agency that may collaborate with CDPHE & CDA on decisions of carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection and their effect on soil, air and water or the environment in general.

11.3 Stakeholders: Local Livestock Industry Groups

Serve as liaison on matters relating to livestock industries affected by an animal disease outbreak.

- Identify individuals who may be qualified to assist in disease control efforts.
- Develop a list of qualified appraisers.
- Provide assistance to families affected by an animal disease outbreak.
- Provide support for disease control and eradication activities.
- Provide appropriate information for dissemination to industries and public (through close coordination with CDA or the IMT public information officer).
- Support response and recovery with all available resources.

11.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Local Poultry Producers and Practicing Veterinarians

Dairy producers and practicing veterinarians will be the first to encounter an emerging disease or foreign animal disease outbreak. It is imperative that they report to the State Veterinarian’s Office or USDA-APHIS-VS Colorado Office any situations in which dairy cattle are experiencing a high morbidity or mortality rates, cases with clinical signs consistent with foot and mouth disease, or any new or emerging disease and any cases of unknown cause or unusual clinical signs. Early detection and diagnosis is the key to mitigating losses to the dairy producers!

Another key responsibility of dairy producers is to implement proper biosecurity protocols. Good biosecurity can greatly reduce the introduction of infectious diseases into a herd. Dairy owners and producers should create plans for responding to disease outbreaks in their herds. By having
SOPs in advance for depopulation and disposal, they can greatly reduce response times and decrease the potential for spread to other facilities.

12.0 Conclusion

The introduction of a highly contagious disease or a dairy incident resulting from an all-hazards event could have devastating effects on Colorado’s dairy industry. Planning and preparation is vital to limiting the scope of a disease outbreak, which depends on rapid detection and eradication. These plans for response to disease eradication can be easily applied to all-hazard events such as wildfires, flooding and tornados, or economically destructive disease that causes significant morbidity or mortality in dairy.

The Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) Dairy Emergency Disease Response Plan provides the response actions that will be implemented by the CDA in collaboration with the USDA-APHIS-VS and dairy industry partners. Whether in commercial operations or smaller dairy operations, execution of the plan will allow swift detection, control, and eradication of a dairy disease outbreak.
Appendix A: Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Action Steps by Animal Health Officials upon Report of Suspected Foreign Animal Disease

The Colorado State Veterinarian or USDA-APHIS-VS personnel will dispatch a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to initiate an investigation within 24 hours of the initial notification.

The FADD will set up an appointment to visit the premises to assess the disease situation, collect and submit laboratory samples. If the FADD has a high suspicion for an FAD, a hold order may be placed. The FADD will file a report with the State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS. The State Veterinarian and USDA-APhis-VS officials will assign a priority level to the laboratory submissions, which will govern the response of the federal lab(s).

Further actions may be taken at the discretion of the State Veterinarian in collaboration with USDA-APHIS-VS officials and in consultation with the FADD that investigated the case along with other veterinary staff.

Laboratory results will be reported to the State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS officials who will notify the appropriate staff and the FADD of the case. The FADD, in consultation with the State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS, will then notify the practitioner and the owner/manager of the facility. See Ready Reference Guide for a visual representation of the steps outlined above.

Information collected during a Foreign Animal Disease Investigation:

- Name and Address of Owner/Manager
- Physical location of the affected premises
- Type of operation being investigated
- Number and type of animals on premises
- Movement of animals on and off premises and date of movement
- Location of animals prior to arriving on premises
- Location of animals after leaving premises
- Number of sick and dead animals
- Physical examinations of the affected animals
- Results of postmortem examinations
- Number and types of samples taken
- Name of suspected disease

Contacts for a suspected FAD:

- Colorado State Veterinarian’s Office at the Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) - Animal Health Division: (303) 869-9130
- USDA-APHIS-VS-SPRS District 6 – Colorado Field Office: (303) 231 – 5385
READY REFERENCE GUIDE: PROCEDURES AND POLICY FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FAD)/EMERGING DISEASE INCIDENTS (EDI) (VS GUIDANCE 12001.2)

FAD INVESTIGATION IS INITIATED

ADD and SAHO will:
- Assign an FADD.
- Ensure FAD Referral Control Number is assigned in EMRS.
- Assign FAD/EDI Case Coordinator(s).
- Ensure that initial case report is prepared and transmitted to the FADD.
- Consult with FADD, NVSL, and NALHN lab to determine a diagnostic sample submission plan. Include ADD and SAHO for State of NALHN lab, if different from the State of sample origin.
- Consult with FADD to ensure that an investigation classification and a diagnostic sample submission priority are assigned.
- If ADD, SAHO, and FADD designate Priority 1 or A, immediately call VS District and NPIC.

FADD will:
- Contact producer/owner/veterinary practitioner within 8 hours, and conduct a site visit within 24 hours. Situations involving interstate or International commerce must be investigated immediately.
- Contact NVSL Ames/NVSL FADD and the NALHN lab by phone prior to sample shipment/transport with the following:
  - Tracking number or transport identification,
  - Estimated time of arrival, and
  - Classification and priority.
- Ensure VS 10-4 Specimen Submission Form is completed for all diagnostic samples.
- Contact ADD, SAHO, and Tribal Officials with quarantine or hold order recommendations.
- Along with ADD, ensure that EMRS data entry and follow-up forms are completed.

NPIC or DISTRICT OFFICE
- Coordinates conference call within 2 hours if Priority 1 or A.

PRIORITY 1
- High Suspicion
- NPIC or District Office coordinates conference call within 2 hours
- Rapid or extraordinary methods for sample collection and transport
- Testing conducted immediately upon arrival (overtime services as needed)

PRIORITY 2
- Intermediate Suspicion
- Rapid methods for sample collection and transport
- Testing conducted as necessary (overtime services as needed)
- If sample arrives before close of business test immediately; after close of business test the following day; Saturday test on weekends only with prior notification and approval

PRIORITY 3
- Low Suspicion
- Routine methods for sample collection and transport
- Testing conducted in accession order (no overtime services)

PRIORITY A
- Intermediate or Low Suspicion
- NPIC or District Office coordinates conference call within 2 hours
- Potential circumstances of investigation indicate need for rapid or extraordinary methods for sample collection and transport
- Testing conducted immediately upon arrival (overtime as needed)

December 2014
Appendix B: List of Acronym
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APHIS</td>
<td>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service</td>
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<td>AVMA</td>
<td>American Veterinary Medical Association</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Code of Colorado Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Colorado Department of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDHSEM</td>
<td>Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDPHE</td>
<td>Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDOT</td>
<td>Colorado Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<td>CIAC</td>
<td>Colorado Information Analysis Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO2</td>
<td>Carbon Dioxide</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Colorado Revised Statutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Colorado Safety Patrol</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Colorado State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVMBs</td>
<td>College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPW</td>
<td>Colorado Parks and Wildlife</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECIMT</td>
<td>Eastern Colorado Incident Management Team</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operation Center</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
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<td>FAD</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease</td>
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<td>FDA</td>
<td>Food and Drug Agency</td>
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<td>FSIS</td>
<td>Food Safety Inspection Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HSEM</td>
<td>Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Interagency Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Incident Action Plan</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMT</td>
<td>Incident Management Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTTF</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Task Force (within FBI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVSL</td>
<td>National Veterinary Service Laboratories</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIE</td>
<td>World Organization of Animal Health (previously Office of Internationale des Epizooties)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSHA</td>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>Premises Identification Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
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<td>SEOC</td>
<td>State Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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## Appendix B cont.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FADD</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician</td>
<td>VMO</td>
<td>Veterinary Medical Officer</td>
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<td>FADDL</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab</td>
<td>VS</td>
<td>Veterinary Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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Appendix C: Organization Chart

Colorado Department of Agriculture
ICS Organization Chart for Animal Disease Response

Jurisdictional Authority
Commissioner of Agriculture

Unified Coordination
State Veterinarian USDA (District 6 AD)

Incident Command
Eastern Colorado Incident Management Team

Public Information Officer

Linkage Officer

Operations Section Chiefs

Planning Section Chiefs

Logistic Section Chiefs

Finance and Administration Section Chiefs

Response Branch

Verification & Inspection Group
Laboratory Diagnosis Group
Valuation/Approval Group
Transportation Group
Disposal Group
Cleaning & Sanitation Group
Vaccination Group

Livestock Control Branch

Vector Control Branch

People & Support Branch

Alternative Livestock Group
Welfare Group
Demographic Group
Path & Roberts Group
Physical Security Group

Environmental Control Group

Education Unit Leader

Disposal Planning Branch
Biostatistics Branch
First Assessment Branch
Vaccination Branch

Resource Unit Leader

Communications Unit

Facilities Unit

Supply Unit

Ground Support Unit

Data Management Unit Leader

Personnel

Equipment

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Appendix D: All-Hazard Incident Complexity Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Name:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incident Number:</td>
<td>Time:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Complexity Analysis is weighed based on the relevance to Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity Factors</th>
<th>Check if Pertinent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impacts to Life, Property, and the Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban interface; structures, developments, recreational facilities, or potential for evacuation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community and Responder Safety</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of public safety resources affected by cumulative fatigue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead overextended mentally and/or physically</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication ineffective with tactical resources or dispatch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident action plans, briefings, etc. missing or poorly prepared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources unfamiliar with local conditions and tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential Hazardous Materials</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential of Hazardous Materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weather and other Environmental Influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique natural resources, special-designation areas, critical municipal watershed, protected species habitat, cultural value sites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Likelihood of Cascading Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety of specialized operations, support personnel or equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential Crime Scene (including Terrorism)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential crime scene</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential of terrorism</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Sensitivity, External Influences, and Media Relations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sensitive political concerns, media involvement, or controversial policy issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Performance Values and Product Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IAP Products not being developed or deficient.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area Involved, Jurisdictional Boundaries</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident threatening more than one jurisdiction and potential for unified command with different conflicting management objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Availability of Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations are at the limit of span of control.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to property staff air operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited local resources available for initial attack/response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy commitment of local resources to logistical support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing forces worked 12 hours without success.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage Score</strong></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If 10% or lower look at going to or staying at Type 4 Team.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If 10 % to 20% maintain or go to Type 3 Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If greater than 20% increase to Type 2 Team or additional overhead</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared By | Date: | Time:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Zoonotic Disease not Diagnosed in the U.S.</th>
<th>Zoonotic Disease Diagnosed in the United States</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>General Operations Areas Surveillance</th>
<th>Near or Contact Premises Surveillance</th>
<th>Biological Control Area Surveillance</th>
<th>Biological Control Area Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Routine Surveillance</td>
<td>Routine Surveillance</td>
<td>Environment Indoor</td>
<td>Environment Outdoor</td>
<td>Environment Indoor</td>
<td>Environment Indoor</td>
<td>Environment Indoor</td>
<td>Indoor Depopulation Preparation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coveralls, Work Uniforms, etc.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Tychem Coveralls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exam gloves (heavy Disposable)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rubber Gloves (heavy duty)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>N-95 or N-100 Filtering Face piece*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goggles (indirect vented)**</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full-face APR with N-100 Canister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SCBA (Self-contained breathing apparatus)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rubber Boots</td>
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* Examples of zoonotic disease with higher transmission risk would include influenza in poultry or other non-avian species, anthrax, plague and tularemia, among others.

**A separate table has been developed for avian influenza. See HPAI PPE Guidelines.
# Appendix E (cont.): Personal Protective Equipment Guidelines for Colorado Department of Agriculture Employees Non-Zoonotic Animal Disease Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Suspect Disease not Diagnosed in the U.S.</th>
<th>Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation</th>
<th>General Operations Areas Surveillance</th>
<th>Near or Contact Premises Surveillance</th>
<th>Biological Control Area Surveillance</th>
<th>Confirmed Diagnosis of Suspect Disease – Emergency Response Activities</th>
<th>Biological Control Area Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Routine Surveillance</td>
<td>Suspect Disease Outbreak Investigation</td>
<td>Routine Surveillance</td>
<td>Routine Surveillance Operations</td>
<td>Routine Surveillance Operations</td>
<td>Indoor Depopulation Preparation</td>
<td>Indoor Depopulation Re-Entry CO₂ &amp; CO₂ Level Testing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coveralls, Work Uniforms, etc.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tychem Coveralls</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exam gloves (heavy Disposable)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X plus</td>
<td>X plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rubber Gloves (heavy duty)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-95 or N-100 Filtering Face piece*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goggles (indirect vented)**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-face APR with N-100 Canister</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBA (Self-contained breathing apparatus) ***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boot Covers (Disposable)</td>
<td>+/- or +/- or +/- or +/- or +/-</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Boots</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Filtering face pieces are recommended to avoid transmission of a disease agent to other physical locations via the responder’s respiratory system as can occur with agents such as the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) virus.

** Goggles /full race piece maybe considered for dust control in any location/activity and should routinely be used in cleaning and disinfection activities.

*** SCBA should be used in altered environments such as gas euthanasia or high risk confined space such as manure pits.
### Appendix F: County Emergency Management Offices of Colorado

Current as of Feb 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colorado County</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Phone Number (24-Hour)</th>
<th>Fax Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>Adams County website</td>
<td>720-521-2182 (pager)</td>
<td>720-523-6150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alamosa</td>
<td>Alamosa County website</td>
<td>719-589-5807 (dispatch)</td>
<td>719-587-5207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arapahoe</td>
<td>Arapahoe County website</td>
<td>303-795-4711 (dispatch)</td>
<td>720-874-4158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archuleta</td>
<td>Archuleta County website</td>
<td>970-731-4799</td>
<td>970-731-4800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baca</td>
<td>Baca County website</td>
<td>719-523-4511(dispatch)</td>
<td>719-523-6776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bent</td>
<td>Bent County website</td>
<td>719-456-1365</td>
<td>719-456-0476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baca</td>
<td>Baca County website</td>
<td>303-441-4444 (dispatch)</td>
<td>303-441-3884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broomfield</td>
<td>Broomfield County website</td>
<td>303-438-6400</td>
<td>720-887-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaffee</td>
<td>Chaffee County website</td>
<td>719-207-2730</td>
<td>719-539-7442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheyenne</td>
<td>Cheyenne County website</td>
<td>719-767-5633 (sheriff)</td>
<td>719-346-8542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Creek</td>
<td>Clear Creek County website</td>
<td>303-679-2393 (dispatch)</td>
<td>303-679-2438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conejos</td>
<td>Conejos County website</td>
<td>719-589-5804</td>
<td>719-376-5661</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costilla</td>
<td>Costilla County website</td>
<td>719-672-3302 (dispatch)</td>
<td>719-672-3003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowley</td>
<td>Crowley County website</td>
<td>719-267-5555 x1 (dispatch)</td>
<td>719-267-3114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custer</td>
<td>Custer County website</td>
<td>719-783-2270</td>
<td>719-783-2410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Delta County website</td>
<td>970-874-2015 (dispatch)</td>
<td>970-874-2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>Denver County website</td>
<td>720-865-5500</td>
<td>720-865-7691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolores</td>
<td>Dolores County website</td>
<td>970-677-2500</td>
<td>970-677-2880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>Douglas County website</td>
<td>303-660-7500 (dispatch)</td>
<td>303-814-8790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Eagle County website</td>
<td>970-479-2201</td>
<td>970-328-8694</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elbert</td>
<td>Elbert County website</td>
<td>303-660-7500</td>
<td>303-805-6159</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>El Paso County website</td>
<td>719-575-8422</td>
<td>719-575-8591</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>Fremont County website</td>
<td>719-792-6411</td>
<td>719-276-7304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colorado County</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Phone Number (24-Hour)</th>
<th>Fax Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garfield</td>
<td>Garfield County website</td>
<td>970-625-8095</td>
<td>970-945-6430</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gilpin</td>
<td>Gilpin County website</td>
<td>303-582-5500 (dispatch)</td>
<td>970-887-1698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand</td>
<td>Grand County website</td>
<td>970-725-3311</td>
<td>970-641-7693</td>
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<td>Gunnison</td>
<td>Gunnison County website</td>
<td>970-641-8000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinsdale</td>
<td>Hinsdale County website</td>
<td>970-641-8201 (dispatch)</td>
<td>970-944-2630</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huerfano</td>
<td>Huerfano County website</td>
<td>719-738-1044 (dispatch)</td>
<td>970-723-4706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>Jackson County website</td>
<td>970-723-4242 (dispatch)</td>
<td>970-723-4706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>Jefferson County website</td>
<td>303-277-0211 (dispatch)</td>
<td>303-271-4905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiowa</td>
<td>Kiowa County website</td>
<td>719-456-1363 (dispatch)</td>
<td>719-438-5503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kit Carson</td>
<td>Kit Carson County website</td>
<td>(719) 343-0911 (office)</td>
<td>719-349-8542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake</td>
<td>Lake County website</td>
<td>719-486-1249</td>
<td>719-486-0139</td>
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<td>La Plata</td>
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<td>970-382-6272</td>
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<td>Larimer</td>
<td>Larimer County website</td>
<td>303-656-3214 (cell)</td>
<td>970-498-9203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Las Animas</td>
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<td>719-846-2211 (sheriff)</td>
<td>719-846-4111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>Lincoln County website</td>
<td>719-743-2426 (sheriff)</td>
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<td>Logan</td>
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<td>970-520-0991 (cell)</td>
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<td>970-242-6707</td>
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<td>Moffat</td>
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<td>Montrose</td>
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<td>Ouray</td>
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<td>970-920-5307</td>
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<td>719-336-4883</td>
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<td>Pueblo</td>
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<td>719-583-6250 (dispatch)</td>
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<td>Rio Grande</td>
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<td>970-846-1552 (cell)</td>
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<td>719-655-2525 (dispatch)</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
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<td>970-345-2244 (sheriff)</td>
<td>970-345-2701</td>
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Appendix G: County Sheriff’s Offices of Colorado

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*Chief of Police for Broomfield and Denver Counties; **Non-emergency number
## Appendix G (Cont.): County Sheriff’s Offices of Colorado

Current as of March 2016

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** Non-emergency number
Appendix H: Colorado County Extension Offices

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<td>(303) 637-8100</td>
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<td>Alamosa</td>
<td>(719) 852-7381</td>
<td>1899 E. Hwy 160, Monte Vista, CO 81144</td>
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<td>Arapahoe</td>
<td>(303) 730-1920</td>
<td>6934 South Lima St, Suite B, Centennial, CO 80112</td>
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<td>Archuleta</td>
<td>(970) 264-5931</td>
<td>344 Highway 84, Pagosa Springs, CO 81147</td>
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<td>Baca</td>
<td>(719) 523-6971</td>
<td>700 Colorado St., Springfield, CO 81073</td>
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<td>Bent</td>
<td>(719) 456-0764</td>
<td>1499 Ambassador Thompson Blvd, Las Animas, CO 81054</td>
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<td>Boulder</td>
<td>(303) 678-6238</td>
<td>9595 Nelson Road, Longmont, CO 80501</td>
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<td>Broomfield</td>
<td>(720) 887-2286</td>
<td>One DesCombes Drive., Broomfield, CO 80020</td>
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<td>Chaffee</td>
<td>(719) 539-6447</td>
<td>10165 County Road 120, Salida, CO 81201</td>
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<td>(719) 767-5716</td>
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<td>(303) 679-2424</td>
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<td>Conejos</td>
<td>(719) 852-7381</td>
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<td>Costilla</td>
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<td>(720) 913-5270</td>
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<td>Dolores</td>
<td>(970) 677-2283</td>
<td>409 North Main Street, c/o Courthouse, Dove Creek, CO 81324</td>
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<td>Garfield</td>
<td>(970) 625-3969</td>
<td>Fairgrounds, 1001 Railroad Avenue, Rifle, CO 81650</td>
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Colorado State University Extension, [http://extension.colostate.edu/staff-directory/](http://extension.colostate.edu/staff-directory/) Feb 2017
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<td>(719) 438-5321</td>
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<td>Kit Carson</td>
<td>(719) 346-5571</td>
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<td>Las Animas</td>
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<td>(970) 522-3200</td>
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<td>(970) 542-3540</td>
<td>914 E. Railroad Ave, Fort Morgan, CO 80701</td>
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<td>Otero</td>
<td>(719) 254-7608</td>
<td>411 North 10th St., Rocky Ford, CO 81067</td>
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<td>(719) 836-4296</td>
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<td>Phillips</td>
<td>(970) 854-3616</td>
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<td>Prowers</td>
<td>(719) 336-7734</td>
<td>1001 S. Main St., Lamar, CO 81052</td>
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<td>Pueblo</td>
<td>(719) 583-6566</td>
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Colorado State University Extension, [http://extension.colostate.edu/staff-directory/](http://extension.colostate.edu/staff-directory/) Feb 2017
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<td>Routt</td>
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<td>(970) 474-3479</td>
<td>315 Cedar, Julesburg, CO 80737</td>
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<td>Summit</td>
<td>(970) 668-3595</td>
<td>37 Peak One Dr., CR1005, Frisco, CO 80443</td>
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<td>Teller</td>
<td>(719) 686-7961</td>
<td>800 Research Dr, Ste 230, Woodland Park, CO 80863</td>
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<td>(970) 400-2066</td>
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<td>(970) 332-4151</td>
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Colorado State University Extension, [http://extension.colostate.edu/staff-directory/](http://extension.colostate.edu/staff-directory/) Feb 2017
Appendix I: Resources and Links

The following resources and links can provide the most up to date information for livestock disease emergency response. It is by no means comprehensive, but can provide a starting point to locate the most recent standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Investigation forms

The most current forms can be found on the APHIS-VS Laboratory Information and Services website. The most common submission form is the VS Form 10-4

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)

OIE List of Reportable Diseases is a unified list of reportable diseases maintained by The World Organization for Animal Health. For several years the OIE created two lists (A and B) with different reporting obligations, but combined them into a single unified list of reportable diseases in 2005. The list has over 130 different diseases and is developed and revised periodically (http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/). The four criteria used to develop the list are: potential for international spread, potential for zoonotic transmission, potential for significant spread within a naïve population and emerging diseases.

APHIS-VS FMD Response Plan (Redbook) and SOPs

The 2014 Redbook reviews in detail Veterinary Services’ (VS) response plan to Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). The standard operating procedures (SOPs) have been posted on a separate website to allow easier access and faster updates to individual plans. These SOPs are found on the FAD PReP website.

Secure Food Supply Plans

The Secure Food Supply Plans are designed to maintain business continuity during a disease outbreak. There are plans for various animals and animal products. In regards to dairy cattle the plans include:

- The Secure Milk Supply Plan
- The Secure Beef Supply Plan

These plans are developed through a collaborative effort between state governments, academia, Industry and USDA-APHIS. The project is funded by USDA-APHIS National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center (NPIC).

APHIS-VS List of EPA Approved Disinfectants for Selected Foreign Animal Diseases

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved disinfectants for use against foreign animal diseases in farm settings. A comprehensive chart detailing diseases and approved disinfectants is provided on the USDA-APHIS Animal Health Emergency Management website. The chart was last revised in 2016.
Appendix K: CDPHE Animal Carcass Disposal Guidelines

All-Hazards Events

Large quantities of animal carcasses that result from an all-hazards event (blizzard, flood, tornado, etc.), any disease-related mass deaths of livestock, or an event in which the state veterinarian determines that depopulation of animals is required, must be managed in a manner that prevents the spread of infection and contamination of soil and ground water. During such events, the Colorado Department of Agriculture is the lead agency and will direct all activities related to management and disposal of carcass wastes. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Agriculture and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (we, us, our) called “Regarding Storage, Treatment or Disposal of Livestock Carcasses During Any All-Hazards Event” is available on our website at colorado.gov/cdphe/swguidance. This agreement provides guidance related to the roles and responsibilities associated with a mass mortality or depopulation event. Emergency preparedness and response plans for control and mitigation of livestock disease outbreaks can be found in the Animal Health Division of the Department of Agriculture’s website (colorado.gov/aganimals) under the Animals tab.

Other Events

Carcasses that are disposed of due to mortality or disease unrelated to an all hazards event or that cannot be used for their original intended purpose are considered to be a solid waste and must be managed in compliance with the Colorado Solid Waste Act (30-20-100.5 et.seq., C.R.S.) and its implementing regulations (6 CCR 1007-2, Part 1). Be aware that under these regulations, special requirements apply to animals known or suspected of being contaminated with infectious substances contagious to humans.

The local or county governments may also have regulations and ordinances regarding the proper management of carcasses. Therefore, you should contact your local public health department concerning local ordinances for disposal. Inappropriate management of these wastes may spread infection or cause contamination of soil or ground water.

In general, the following best management practices may be used for the safe disposal of carcasses that are not contaminated with infectious substances contagious to humans.

Disposal at a Permitted Landfill

Carcasses may be sent to a permitted solid waste landfill for disposal with the landfill operator’s prior approval. You will need to contact the landfill operator first to determine their waste acceptance policies. Many landfills have specific days or times when they will accept carcasses for disposal or may have certain packaging requirements that must be met before they will accept the waste.
Rendering
Carcasses may be sent to a licensed rendering plant with the rendering plant operator’s prior approval. You should contact the plant to make arrangements before sending the carcasses. Again, these facilities may have specific preparation and packaging requirements for the carcasses that must be met before they will accept carcasses for disposal.

Off-site Incineration
Carcasses may be sent to an off-site incinerator (for example, a pet crematory) that is permitted and approved by local authorities and/or our Air Pollution Control Division to accept such wastes. You should contact the facility to see if they have any preparation or quantity limitations prior to transporting the carcasses.

Composting
Carcasses may be sent to an off-site composting facility that is permitted to accept such wastes. You will need to contact the composting facility directly and determine their waste acceptance policies prior to shipping the carcasses.

Composting of carcasses may be allowed on your own property. Depending on the specifics of your operation, it may be regulated 1) by the Colorado Department of Agriculture and exempt from Solid Waste regulations; or 2) regulated under dual authority of our Solid Waste Program and the local governing authority in accordance with Section 14 of 6 CCR 1007-2. Under Option 2 above, you will need to have an approved composting plan in place before you may conduct such operations. Composting plan requirements are described in Colorado’s solid waste regulations (6 CCR 1007-2, Part 1, Section 14.11). These plans must include, but are not limited to:

- The basis for selecting the composting site, including site conditions that make it appropriate for a composting operation.
- Structures to be used for run-on and runoff controls.
- Odor management.
- A description of the composting operation, including how the compost will be managed and tested, and what will be done with the final product

Pit Incineration
In certain cases, carcasses may be incinerated in an onsite pit. Open burning permits, obtained through our Air Pollution Control Division, are required for this process. Pit incineration is generally used when there are several animal mortalities that resulted from disease and there is a risk for disease transmission if the carcasses are transported for disposal offsite. Additional controls, such as plans for disposition of the ash and other remains, must be specified prior to using this process.

On-Site Burial
Carcasses may be buried on-site once concurrence has been obtained from this department and the appropriate local agencies. If you bury your carcasses on your own property, you should follow these best management practices:
• Layers of lime or quicklime should be applied below and above the carcass to help accelerate decomposition of the waste. Care should be used in applying lime as it is caustic and can cause severe burns to the skin and eyes.
• Burial pits must be covered with a minimum of two feet of soil.
• Carcasses cannot be placed in any body of water, seasonal creek or pond, or in areas that may carry or hold water such as gullies, ditches, blowouts or natural depressions.
• To minimize potential impacts to groundwater, large numbers of bigger carcasses (e.g., more than ten cows) should not be limed and buried together.
• Surface water must be diverted from the burial site through the use of berms or other structures.
• All carcasses must be buried at least 150 feet away from any water supply source.
• All carcasses must be buried downgradient from any groundwater supply sources.
• The bottom of the burial pit must be at least five feet above the high point of the uppermost groundwater table to ensure that carcasses do not come into contact with groundwater.
• Burial sites must be located at least one mile away from any residence of any person.
• Burial sites should not be located in areas with fractured or cavernous rock, high seasonal water tables or highly permeable soils.

Other disposal practices, including alkaline hydrolysis and mobile incineration, may be used with prior approval.

If you have a large number of animal mortalities due to disease, including Avian Flu, contact the Colorado Department of Agriculture or State Veterinarian’s Office for further guidance on controlling livestock and poultry disease. The Department of Agriculture will determine if the mortalities should be managed as an all-hazards event.

For more information, contact:

Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Division
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